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Abstract 
Among many legal professionals and memory researchers there exists the assumption 
that susceptibility to false memory decreases with age. In four misinformation 
experiments, we show that under conditions that focus on the meaning of experiences, 
children are not always the most susceptible to suggestion-induced false memories. 
We begin by presenting a short overview of previous developmental false memory 
studies, the majority of which have found that the susceptibility to misinformation 
decreases with age. In Experiment 1, 6/7-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds, and adults 
received a video and were confronted with misinformation about related but non-
presented details. Older children and adults had higher misinformation acceptance 
rates than younger children. In Experiment 2, we replicated this finding adding a 
younger child group (4/6-year-olds). In Experiments 3 and 4, we used new material 
and again found that susceptibility to misinformation increased with age. Together, 
these experiments show that children’s memory accuracy is not necessarily inferior to 
that of adults’.  
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The Malleability of Developmental Trends in Neutral and Negative Memory 
Illusions 
In most child development textbooks, readers find that older children typically 
outperform younger children on most if not all tasks.  This includes measures of 
learning, memory, reasoning, and complex problem solving.  However, recently there 
have been a number of counterintuitive developmental findings reported in the 
literature, ones that show that younger children outperform older children.  For 
example, sometimes, younger children generate more creative problem solutions than 
older children (e.g., generate more alternative ways to use tools; see Defeyter & 
German, 2003) or find it easier to learn certain unusual abstract causal principals (see 
Gopnik, Griffiths, & Lucas, 2015).  In memory development, younger children can 
sometimes be less susceptible to memory illusions than older children and adults 
(Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008).  Under these conditions, younger children can be 
better eyewitnesses than older children or adults. 
These so-called developmental reversals mark an important exception to the 
standard textbook aphorisms.  However, there is at least one developmental aphorism 
that has remained despite these recently reported reversals.  Specifically, false 
memories induced by suggestion tend to decline gradually between childhood and 
adulthood (Brainerd, 2013; Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 1993).  This 
developmental trend has been the focus of considerable research, not only because it 
is of theoretical relevance when trying to understand memory changes that occur with 
age, but also because it has important forensic implications. Specifically, the law is 
concerned with how children’s susceptibility to memory illusions makes them less 
reliable witnesses in judicial proceedings.  Indeed, oftentimes, legal professionals 
regard children’s evidentiary statements as being less credible than adults’ (e.g., Bruer 
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& Pozzulo, 2014; Knutsson & Allwood, 2014) because of children’s greater 
susceptibility to suggestion-induced memory illusions.   
The assumption that children are more susceptible to memory illusions than 
adults is also shared among many memory researchers.  For example, Sutherland and 
Hayne (2001, p. 388) observed that, “the general finding is that suggestibility 
decreases as a function of age.”  Recently, McGuire, London, and Wright (2015, p. 
334) voiced a similar conclusion that “previous suggestibility and misinformation 
studies [has indicated] that false memory declines with age.”  Such statements 
reinforce the long-held belief that as children mature, suggestion- and 
misinformation-based false memory rates decrease. 
Over the past few decades, research has accumulated that shows that another 
type of memory illusion, spontaneous false memories, exhibits the opposite 
developmental pattern. Spontaneous false memories are ones that arise without any 
external pressure and occur as a consequence of the activation of related information 
in an individual’s knowledge base.  Research has demonstrated that these false 
memories increase significantly between childhood and adulthood, a phenomenon 
that has been dubbed developmental reversal (Brainerd, 2013).  In the current studies, 
we assessed whether the common developmental trend in suggestion-based memory 
illusions can also be “reversed” such that younger children are less susceptible to 
suggestion than older children and adults.  These experiments emerged from our 
speculation that the standard developmental trend in suggestion-induced false 
memories can be attenuated or even reversed when applying theoretical principles 
borrowed from research on the development of spontaneous false memories.  Before 
presenting these experiments, we provide a brief overview of developmental 
trajectories in both spontaneous and suggestion-induced false memories.  
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Developmental Trends and False Memory Paradigms 
Several paradigms include suggestive pressure in order to create false 
memories.  An often-used method is the misinformation paradigm (Loftus, 2005), a 
procedure that has three stages: Participants first witness an event (e.g., see a video of 
an unarmed theft), are then presented with misinformation about the event (e.g., they 
are told that the culprit carried a gun), and finally, participants receive a memory test.  
What studies have shown is that about 30% of participants falsely remember seeing 
the suggested detail (e.g., the gun) in the original event.  This result is known as the 
misinformation effect and it is more pronounced in younger than older children and 
adults (Loftus, 2011; Otgaar, Candel, Smeets, & Merckelbach, 2010).  
Importantly, suggestive pressure and misinformation are not the same.  
Misinformation usually involves the subsequent presentation of (related) information 
that was not part of the original event.  Suggestive pressure can occur in a number of 
different forms, ranging from the suggestion that an event occurred in a person’s life 
when in fact it never did (memory implantation paradigm; e.g., see Otgaar et al., 
2012) to more subtle forms in which false memories are created when eyewitnesses 
talk to each other and include false details about what was witnessed (memory 
conformity paradigm; e.g., see Wright, Memon, Skagerberg, & Gabbert, 2009). 
The most frequent method used to induce spontaneous false memories is the 
Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1995; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995).  Here, participants are presented with word lists containing associatively-
related words (e.g., tears, sorrow, baby).  The meanings of these words converge on a 
non-presented word known as the critical lure (i.e., cry).  A robust finding is that the 
critical lure is often erroneously remembered during recall or recognition tests 
(Brainerd et al., 2008).  Of relevance for the current studies is that these spontaneous 
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false memories increase with age in childhood, a finding that has intrigued researchers 
because the trend is the opposite of the developmental decreases associated with 
suggestion-based memory illusions (Brainerd et al., 2008; Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 
2002; Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Sauerland, 
& Raymaekers, 2013).  This developmental reversal has not only been detected when 
using DRM lists but also with other meaning-connected procedures such as when 
categorized materials or pictures are presented (e.g., Bruer & Pozzulo, 2014; Howe, 
2006, 2008; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004).  When considered together, these findings are 
somewhat perplexing because they suggest that young children are both more and less 
susceptible to memory illusions than older children and adults.   
To illustrate these different developmental patterns, we first examined the 
available literature on age-related trends in suggestion-induced false memories using 
the misinformation paradigm.1 We came across 29 articles in which findings were 
described about the development of false memories using the classic misinformation 
paradigm (Table 1). As we anticipated, Figure 1a shows that the majority of these 
papers have found an age-related decrease in susceptibility to misinformation, a 
pattern that confirms ours as well as others’ (e.g., McGuire et al., 2015) view about 
typical developmental trends in suggestion-induced false memories.  This contrasts 
nicely with Figure 1b that shows the exact opposite developmental pattern for 
spontaneous false memories using the DRM paradigm (taken from Brainerd, Reyna, 
& Zember, 2011). 
Explaining Developmental Reversals in Spontaneous False Memories 
This developmental reversal effect is anticipated by a number of theories.  For 
example, Fuzzy-trace Theory (FTT; Brainerd et al., 2008) assumes that experiences 
are stored using two opposing memory traces, verbatim and gist.  Verbatim traces are 
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involved in the storage of item-specific, detailed surface characteristics of an event 
whereas gist traces are related to the underlying meaning of an event.  In FTT, false 
memories occur when verbatim traces are not available at retrieval and people rely on 
gist traces.  Retrieved information that is consistent with the underlying meaning of 
an experience can be falsely recollected in the absence of contradictory verbatim 
information.  Because the ability to extract the gist of experiences increases with age, 
and because it is not always possible to use verbatim memories to suppress the output 
of false memories, false memories tend to increase with age.  Memory research has 
confirmed that children have more difficulty extracting gist from presented 
information and are poorer at generating links between different parts of an 
experience than adults (Bjorklund, 1987, 2005; Esposito, 1975).  
Another theory that accounts for this developmental reversal is the 
Associative-activation Theory (AAT; Howe et al., 2009; Otgaar et al., 2013).  AAT is 
a theory that explains the development of different types of false memories based in 
part on correlated developmental differences in knowledge base and automatic 
processing.  The core point of AAT is that false memories arise due to spreading 
activation across meaning-connected information in memory.  Processing of a word 
or concept results in an immediate and parallel spread of activation to related concept 
nodes in a person’s knowledge base (mental lexicon; Anderson, 1983; Collins & 
Loftus, 1975; Landauer & Dumais, 1997).  During this spread of activation, concepts 
activate related concepts some of which were not experienced, leading to the 
production of false memories.  
According to AAT, false memories increase with age because of changes in 
the structure, content, and speed of access to information in a child’s knowledge base.  
It is because of these changes that the strength and automaticity of associative 
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activation increases with age, something which in turn catalyzes age-related increases 
in false memories from childhood through to adulthood (Howe, 2005; Howe & 
Wilkinson, 2011; Otgaar, Candel, Scoboria, & Merckelbach, 2010; Otgaar, Smeets, & 
Peters, 2012).  False memories are more likely to develop as children mature because 
they gain knowledge and experience through formal and informal learning 
opportunities as well as through exposure to an increasingly complex array of 
experiences.  
Creating Developmental Reversals in Suggestion-induced False Memories 
In the current set of studies, we examined whether we could systematically 
alter (attenuate or reverse) developmental trends in suggestion-based false memories 
by using our understanding of how spontaneous memory illusions arise from 
meaning-connected memory information. Although spontaneous false memories are 
chiefly the result of endogenous processes (e.g., relying on meaning, spreading 
activation), suggestion-based false memories occur because of endogenous and 
exogenous (e.g., social influences) processes (also see Brainerd et al., 2008).  The 
false memory paradigms that are used to evoke suggestion-based false memories do 
not contain the necessary ingredients that educe the age-related increases in false 
memories seen in the DRM paradigm.  This is because these paradigms represent an 
amalgam of endogenous and exogenous (e.g., suggestive pressure) manipulations 
whereas what is needed is more of a focus on the endogenous (memory) processes of 
this task (e.g., meaning, spreading activation).  In fact, such design changes should be 
relatively easy to implement.  As Brainerd et al. (2011, p. 376) suggests, “the standard 
[misinformation] paradigm can readily be adjusted to fit the algorithm by instantiating 
the meaning of objects/events that are supplied to children as misinformation with 
many things that they actually experience during the initial phase of such an 
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experiment, much like DRM lists.”  So basically, during the initial phase of a 
misinformation experiment, participants should receive stimuli that are meaning 
connected.  Following this, participants should be presented with misinformation that 
preserves the underlying meaning of the originally presented stimuli.  The prediction 
is that this adapted misinformation procedure will likely result in an attenuated or 
even a reversed developmental trend like the one that is commonly found for 
spontaneous false memories.   
Surprisingly, few researchers have followed these specific adjustments a priori 
to test whether false memories induced by suggestion using the misinformation 
paradigm can increase with age in a manner similar to spontaneous false memories 
(Ceci, Papierno, & Kulkofsky, 2007). Although certain studies (Connolly & Price, 
2006; Fazio & Marsh, 2008; Principe, Gauiliano, & Root, 2008; Ross et al., 2006) 
have found developmental reversal effects in other paradigms such as memory 
conformity, developmental reversals for implanted false memories such as those 
elicited by the misinformation are practically non-existent. Considering that these 
false memories are perhaps one of the most relevant memory illusions in legal cases 
(Loftus, 2005), it is relevant to examine developmental reversals in the 
misinformation paradigm. More importantly, although some studies have found 
developmental reversal effects in other paradigms, they did not specifically check 
whether the presented stimuli contained related details and hence catalyzed false 
memory production; something that we will do in the present experiments (see 
below).  
The Current Experiments 
In the current set of four experiments, we focused on the theoretical conditions 
necessary to alter developmental trends in children’s and adults’ suggestion-based 
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false memories.  Specifically, based on the tenets of both AAT and FTT, we modified 
the misinformation paradigm.  Here, we presented participants with newly developed, 
forensically relevant video stimuli depicting events that contained meaning related 
details.  We used videos because they are rich in perceptual detail and are frequently 
used in standard misinformation experiments (Loftus, 2005).  
For Experiment 1, we constructed new videos that were based on principles 
found in the DRM paradigm (i.e., FTT’s gist extraction or AAT’s associative 
relatedness).  These videos were then included in a misinformation paradigm and 
were presented to 6/7-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds, and adults.  After the presentation 
of these videos, participants received misinformation about the videos and were then 
given a recognition task.  In order to compare our findings with the DRM paradigm, 
participants were also given a standard DRM word list task.  We conducted a second 
experiment in which our goal was to replicate the findings from Experiment 1 with a 
younger age group of 4/6-year-olds.  For Experiments 3 and 4, we constructed yet 
another new video showing that the effects of Experiments 1 and 2 were not limited to 
the type of material used. In all of these experiments, the basic prediction was that 
when using meaning-connected stimuli, typical developmental trends in suggestion-
induced false memories will be attenuated or even reversed.  
Based on AAT and FTT, some specific predictions can be made about when 
standard developmental trajectories in suggestion-based false memories should 
become attenuated or reversed.  For example, both AAT and FTT predict that just like 
the developmental reversals seen with DRM word lists, young children will be less 
likely to grasp the underlying meaning of these meaning-connected videos than older 
children and adults.  Thus, when misinformation is provided about critical, non-
presented details, older children and adults will be more likely to accept this 
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suggested misinformation than younger children.  So, based on both AAT and FTT, 
our expectation was that when using meaning-connected videos, we should see a 
developmental reversal such that susceptibility to misinformation increases rather 
than decreases with age.  
 Interestingly, AAT also predicts additional circumstances under which 
developmental trends in suggestion-based false memories can become attenuated or 
reversed.  In AAT, considerable weight is placed on the link between false memories 
and theme nodes.  So, not only does spreading activation result in the activation of 
related concepts in one’s knowledge base, but it also leads to the activation of theme 
nodes: nodes that are related to the subset of concepts being activated (Arndt & 
Reder, 2003; Howe & Wilkinson, 2011; Otgaar et al., 2014). Theme nodes are part of 
associative memory networks and they too can give rise to false recollections.  The 
idea is that material (e.g., DRM word lists) that activates fewer themes leads to more 
false memories than material that converges on multiple themes.  The reason is that 
material containing fewer themes is more likely to activate that theme more quickly 
than when there are multiple themes.  Moreover, the overall activation of this single 
theme may be greater than that for materials that have more themes because activation 
in this latter case is more dispersed across the many different themes.  The 
consequence is that these higher levels of activation of a single theme catalyze false 
memories. 
One way to examine this claim is to explore the effects of valence (i.e., neutral 
or negative) on developmental trends in false memory.  Because the events that 
children encounter in forensic settings contain a number of important emotional 
elements, understanding how emotion modulates developmental patterns of (false) 
memories is important if findings are to be generalized to the legal field (also see 
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Otgaar et al., 2013). If we look at the literature surrounding the effects of emotion on 
memory, then many studies have shown that emotional events boost memory 
performance (e.g., Mather, 2009; Phelps, 2006). This is especially true when these 
emotional events evoke arousal (and even stress), particularly during encoding and 
consolidation (Smeets, Otgaar, Candel, & Wolf, 2008). The main point here is that 
memory performance changes when emotional events evoke arousal.  One idea is that 
arousal attracts attention to the evoking stimulus that in turn leads to binding of 
memory features, enhancing subsequent memory performance.  It has also been 
shown that event valence (particularly negative valence) affects memory because 
emotional memories consist of well-integrated and dense networks of interrelated 
concepts (see e.g., Talmi, 2013).  In such a network, information is more likely to 
spread in a fast and automatic manner leading to better memory.   
Because emotional events frequently boost memory accuracy, one would 
expect that this might also protect individuals from forming false memories for 
arousing and negative events. Although research concerning the relation between 
emotion and memory in adults suggests that negative events are less likely to foster 
false memories than neutral or positive events. (e.g., Corson & Verrier, 2007; 
Storbeck & Clore, 2005), recent studies have shown that negative stimuli can increase 
false memory rates over neutral stimuli (e.g., Howe, 2007; Howe, Candel, Otgaar, 
Malone, & Wimmer, 2010; Otgaar, Candel, & Merckelbach, 2008; Porter, Spence, & 
Birt, 2003) and that developmental reversals are present for different emotionally 
charged materials (e.g., Howe et al., 2010; Quas, Rush, Yim, Edelstein, Otgaar, & 
Smeets, in press).  In AAT, this is expected because negative information converges 
on fewer theme nodes than neutral information.  In FTT, this is predicted because it is 
easier to extract the gist of negative than neutral information (e.g., Brainerd, Holliday, 
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Reyna, Yang, & Toglia, 2011). Thus, higher false memory rates are expected for 
negative than neutral materials.  Although this is true for spontaneous false memories, 
how emotion interacts with developmental trends in suggestion-based false memories 
and whether developmental reversals in suggestion-based false memories are 
modulated by emotionally-laden events has not been directly addressed.  To 
investigate the influence of valence on false memory, children and adults in our 
experiments were presented with negative (as well as neutral stimuli).  
Experiment 1 
For Experiment 1, we began by conducting a pilot study to develop new 
material.  We presented participants with critical cue words (e.g., pistol, mailbox) and 
they had to provide response items related to these words.  We used adult participants 
in this pilot work because research has shown that even if we had used material 
relevant specifically to children’s knowledge base, developmental patterns of false 
memory production are still quite robust (e.g., Metzger et al., 2008).  The response 
items produced by adults were then used to construct two videos (i.e., a robbery and a 
postman bringing mail) in which the critical items were not included in the video. 
 For this pilot task, we developed a situational gist task where participants had 
to provide as many related response items as they could to each of a number of 
critical cue words in two different contexts, a cafeteria robbery and a postman 
delivering mail.  These related response items were then used to develop two new 
videos.  There were 20 participants (mean age = 21.50, SD = 2.89; 10 male) who each 
received a booklet in which 12 critical cue words were mentioned (e.g., pistol, money, 
glasses, mailbox).  Importantly, for half of the critical cue words, it was stated that 
they had to come up with related response items when thinking about a robbery and 
for the other half of the items, they had to think about a scene in which a postman is 
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bringing mail. For example, the exact instruction for the robbery scene was: “A 
cafeteria at a gym club is being robbed by a armed man. Try to come up with as many 
items (minimum of 5) that are related to this event.”  They were given for the entire 
task (for all cue words) 15 min. in order to generate as many related response items as 
they could. 
The presentation order of the scenarios was counterbalanced across 
participants.  For each of these scenarios, we selected 3 items to serve as central 
details for the video and 3 to serve as peripheral details.  So, in total, there were 6 
central and 6 peripheral items.  Central items referred to details depicting the thematic 
content of the video (i.e., the robbery) whereas peripheral details were not specifically 
related to the theme of the video.  
 The participants produced many related response items (N = 449).  For each of 
the critical items, we selected the 5 related items that were produced most often by 
participants.  For example, for the central critical response word pistol in the robbery 
scene, participants came up with many different details (e.g., bullet), but most often 
mentioned were the following related items: perpetrator, silver necklace, black jacket, 
hat, and black trousers.  These related items (but not the critical items were used as 
stimuli in the situational gist task) were included in the video of the robbery.  These 
two new videos were presented to participants (6/7-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds, adults) 
in a modified misinformation paradigm.  Our prediction was that when the 
misinformation was presented, older children and adults would be more likely to 
confuse the misinformation with the presented items in the videos than the younger 
children.  Also, to compare our findings with the developmental trend in spontaneous 
false memories, we presented participants with both neutral and negative DRM word 
lists.  
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Method 
Participants 
Eighty-five participants were included, with 23 6/7-year-olds (mean age = 
6.70, SD = 0.56; 11 boys; range: 6-7), 30 11/12-year-olds (mean age = 11.47, SD = 
0.63; 17 boys; range 11-12), and 32 adults (mean age = 21.38, SD = 3.53; 9 male; 
range 18-33).  A power analysis with a power of 0.80 and a small to medium effect 
size (ŋ²partial = 0.06) resulted in a sample size of 80.  For the child groups, we received 
school and parent permission to test 53 children (23 + 30). The remaining participants 
were tested in the adult pool. We tested 5 extra participants in case participants 
dropped out of the experiment, thus data collection was terminated after testing 85 
participants.  Children received a small gift and adults received a small financial 
reimbursement.  All children had parental consent and assented on the day of testing.  
The study was approved by the standing ethical committee of the Faculty of 
Psychology and Neuroscience at Maastricht University. 
Design  
 This experiment consisted of a 3(Age: 6/7-year-olds vs. 11/12-year-olds vs. 
adults) x 2(Misinformation: yes vs. no) x 2(Detail: central vs. peripheral) x 
2(Valence: negative vs. neutral) mixed design with the latter three factors being 
within-participant variables.  
Materials 
 Videos. Two videos were constructed based on the findings from the pilot 
experiment and that differed in emotional content.  One video was emotionally 
negative and was about a robbery in a cafeteria in which a culprit enters the cafeteria 
and demands money from the people at the cash desk.  The other video was neutral 
and showed a postman delivering mail and a man opening the door to receive the 
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mail.  In each video, 30 items were presented that were associatively related to 6 
critical items (3 central and 3 peripheral).  Each video lasted for about 1 minute and 10 
seconds.  During the videos, we ensured that all presented items were unambiguously 
visible.  
Misinformation.  Misinformation was presented in the form of an eyewitness 
account of the videos.  This eyewitness account was audiotaped and played back to 
the participants. A research assistant that was not involved in this experiment acted as 
the eyewitness and was audiotaped when reading the account. The eyewitness 
accounts (control vs. critical) were the same for each participant. During the 
misinformation phase, the eyewitness mentioned 6 new critical items and 18 old items 
from the original video that were related to the critical items (for each critical item, 3 
related items were presented from the original video). We also made a control version 
in which an eyewitness only mentioned the 18 original items without the new critical 
items.  
Recognition task for the videos.  Our recognition task was also audio taped 
and consisted of 48 correct items, 12 critical items, 12 non-presented related items, 
and 48 non-presented unrelated items. The recognition task was presented at a 5-
second rate per item. Responses were recorded by the experimenter.  
DRM lists.  Five neutral (bread, smoke, window, foot, sweet) and five 
negative (murder, punishment, cry, death, pain) 10-word DRM lists were used in this 
experiment.  The effectiveness of these lists in generating false memories has been 
demonstrated in previous studies (Howe et al., 2010; Otgaar & Candel, 2011; Otgaar 
et al., 2012) and list items were chosen from the Dutch word association norms (Van 
Loon-Vervoorn & Van Bekkum, 1991).  List items were presented in order of 
associative strength to the non-presented critical lure, from strongest to weakest. 
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Using the Celex lexical database (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Gulikers, 1995), it was 
ensured that the mean word frequency of neutral and emotional critical lures did not 
differ statistically, t(8) = 0.22, ns.  Similarly, the mean backward associative strength 
between the neutral list items and their critical lures and the mean backward 
associative strength between the emotional list items and their critical lures did not 
vary statistically, t(8) = 1.69, ns. 
Recognition task for the DRM lists.  The recognition task for the DRM lists 
consisted of a total of 78 words where there were 40 correct items, 10 critical lures, 
10 non-presented related items, and 18 non-presented unrelated items. The 
recognition task was audio taped and was presented at a 5-second rate per item.  
Procedure  
Children were tested individually in rooms at their elementary school and 
adults were tested at the university.  Participants were informed that they were 
involved in a memory study and then received either the videos (misinformation 
paradigm) or the DRM lists first.  Order of presentation of the stimuli was 
counterbalanced within each task.  Our methodology was similar to the standard 
misinformation paradigm used in previous studies (Loftus, 2005). During 
presentation, participants saw the two videos on a computer screen and were told to 
pay close attention to them. After witnessing the videos, participants were given a 
non-verbal filler task (playing Tetris) for 3 minutes.  Then, participants received audio 
taped misinformation about one of the videos and heard an audio taped control 
version with no misinformation about the other video.  The order of the presentation 
of the misinformation and control tapes was also counterbalanced.  Following 
exposure to the misinformation and the control tapes, participants had to perform a 
non-verbal filler task (playing Tetris) for 3 minutes.  Next, they received a recognition 
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task in which they were asked to recognize only those items that were presented in the 
videos.  After the recognition task, all participants had to rate the emotionality of the 
videos on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive). This was done 
to examine whether participants had noticed the valence of the videos.  The negative 
video (M = 2.68, SD  = 0.90) received statistically lower ratings than the neutral video 
(M = 3.55, SD = 0.75; F(1, 84) = 52.25, p < .001, ŋ²p = 0.38) indicating that the 
valence manipulation was effective.  For the DRM word lists, participants received 
either the neutral lists first or the negative lists first.  After the DRM word lists, 
participants were involved in a non-verbal filler task (playing Tetris).  Then, 
participants were presented with the DRM recognition task.   
Results 
As is customary in developmental research on spontaneous false memories, 
scores were corrected for possible response bias, a correction that leads to purer 
measures of hits and false memory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2007; Brainerd et al., 2008; 
Holliday, Brainerd, & Reyna, 2011).  Specifically, scores of all experiments were 
transformed using the following signal detection parameters: d’ (memory 
discrimination) and c (response bias) (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988).2  Higher d’ values 
stand for high memory discrimination. Negative c values represent a liberal bias while 
positive c values refer to a conservative bias. Furthermore, when we analyzed age 
effects with three groups in all of our experiments, we used Bonferroni correction.  
We begin by presenting the video data and then turn to the DRM lists.  
Finally, we present the analyses concerning the relationship between performance on 
the video task and performance on the DRM task.  All data (raw and transformed) are 
reported in Tables 2- 7.  
Video Task 
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Hit rates 
Memory discrimination. We performed a 3(Age: 6/7-year-olds vs. 11/12-
year-olds vs. adults) x 2(Misinformation: yes vs. no) x 2(Detail: central vs. peripheral) 
x 2(Valence: negative vs. neutral) mixed ANOVA on the d’ hit rates.  Our results 
yielded a statistically significant Age effect (F(2, 82) = 3.83, p = .03, ŋ²p = 0.09).  
Post-hoc tests revealed that adults had statistically higher d’ values than the older 
children (p = .03). All other comparisons were not statistically significant. We also 
found a statistically significant Valence effect (F(1, 82) = 22.59, p < .001, ŋ²p = 0.22) 
with the negative video having statistically higher d’ values than the neutral video. 
Furthermore, central details had higher d’ values than peripheral details (F(1, 82) = 
14.07, p < .001, ŋ²p = 0.15)  All other effects were not significant, including those 
concerning the misinformation manipulation (see Table 3).  
Bias. Like the discrimination index, we found a statistically significant Age 
effect (F(2, 78) = 7.10, p = .001, ŋ²p = 0.15) with post-hoc comparisons showing that 
bias was most liberal in the 6/7-year-olds, but only statistically decreased for the 
11/12-year-olds (p = .001). A statistically significant Valence effect also emerged 
(F(1, 78) = 15.24, p < .001, ŋ²p = 0.16) with the neutral video having more liberal bias 
scores than the negative video. Furthermore, bias scores were more liberal for the 
peripheral than central details (F(1, 78) = 8.27, p = .005, ŋ²p = 0.10; Table 4). 
False Memory 
Memory discrimination. A similar series of statistical analyses was 
performed on the corrected false memory scores (critical items).  First, the most 
important analysis pertained to whether susceptibility to misinformation increased 
with age. We indeed found evidence for this. Our analyses revealed a significant 
Valence x Age x Misinformation interaction (F(2, 79) =8.26, p = .001, ŋ²p = .17).  
Development of False Memories 20 
Additional tests showed the following results. For the negative video, there was a 
significant Age x Misinformation interaction (F(2, 79) = 3.83, p = .03, ŋ²p = .09) with 
simple effects showing that the susceptibility to misinformation (suggestion-based) 
false memories increased significantly with age; see Table 2).  That is, for both types 
of details, we found that adults (central: M = 4.99, SD = 6.01; peripheral: M = 6.30, 
SD = 3.60) and older children (central: M = 2.35, SD = 5.72; peripheral: M = 6.39, SD 
= 2.96) had significantly higher d’ values rates than younger children (central: M = 
0.48, SD = 2.66; peripheral: M = 5.43, SD = 5.39; p < .05).  The difference between 
11/12-year-olds and adults was not significant (p = 1.00; Table 3).  
For the neutral video, we also found a significant Age x Misinformation 
interaction (F(2, 79) = 3.18, p = .047, ŋ²p = .08).  Further analyses showed that like the 
negative video, the propensity to suggestion-based false memories increased from the 
6/7-year-olds (M = 4.98) to the 11/12-year-olds (M = 5.55; p < .05;), but this 
difference fell short of statistical significance. For the participants who did not receive 
misinformation, only 6/7-year-olds (M = 5.50) had statistically higher discrimination 
values than 11/12-year-olds (M = 2.42; p = .01). 
Second, we found a significant Age x Detail x Valence interaction (F(2, 79) =   
8.51, p  < .001, ŋ²p = .18).  For the neutral video, results yielded a significant Age x 
Detail interaction (F(2, 79) = 5.19, p = .008, ŋ²p = .12).  Here, additional analyses 
showed that for the central details, 6/7-year-olds (M = 7.75, SD = 4.36) and adults (M 
= 4.71, SD = 4.95) differed significantly in their d’ values (p = .04).  Older children  
(M = 5.40, SD = 3.79) did not differ statistically from the other groups (ps > .05).  For 
the peripheral details, there were no statistically significant differences (p = 1.00). 
  For the negative video, we found a statistically significant Age x Detail 
interaction (F(2, 79) = 3.61, p = .03, ŋ²p = .08) with simple effects tests showing that 
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d’ values for the peripheral details were higher than d’ values for the central aspects 
for younger (peripheral: M = 7.52, SD = 5.25; central: M = 2.16, SD = 3.22; F(1,  21) 
= 31.17, p < .001, ŋ²p = .60) and older children (peripheral: M = 5.95, SD = 4.23; 
central: M = 2.49; SD = 4.49; F(1, 28) = 13,05, p < .001, ŋ²p = .32), but there were no 
significant differences for adults (F(1, 30) = 1.74, p = .20, ŋ²p =.06).  
 Bias. Our analysis found a significant Valence x Age X Misinformation 
interaction (F(2, 79) = 6.76, p = .002, ŋ²p = 0.15). When we performed additional 
tests, we found the following. For the negative video, we found a significant Age x 
Misinformation (F(2, 79) = 6.24, p = .004, ŋ²p = 0.14). When misinformation was 
provided, 6/7-year-olds (M = -4.72) had statistically lower liberal bias scores than the 
11/12-year-olds (M = -0.60, p = .02) while the reverse was true when no 
misinformation was given. Here, 6/7-year-olds (M = 0.48) were more conservative 
than adults (M = -3.12, p = .01).  
For the neutral video, we found a main effect of Misinformation (F(1, 79) = 
5.69, p = .02, ŋ²p = 0.07) in which the presentation of misinformation led to more 
liberal bias values (M = -2.97) than when no misinformation was introduced (M = -
1.24).  All other effects were not statistically significant (see alsoTable 4). 
False alarms for related and unrelated non-presented items 
Memory discrimination. We also executed analyses on the d’ values of the 
non-presented related items.  We found an Age x Valence interaction (F(2, 78) = 
3.71, p = .03, ŋ²p = 0.09) . Follow-up tests revealed that for the neutral video, adults 
(M = -1.64) did not differ in their discrimination values from 11/12-year-olds (M = -
2.10) and 6/7-year-olds (M = -1.10) while the two child groups did differ (p = .03). 
For the negative video, discrimination values did differ between adults (M = -0.78) 
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and 6/7-year-olds (M = 0.31; p = .03), but not for 11/12-year-olds (M = -1.04; p = 
1.00).   
Bias. For the bias scores, we only found an Age effect (F(2, 78) = 8.08, p = 
.001, ŋ²p = 0.17) with adults (M = -6.50) differing statistically between 6/7-year-olds 
(M = -4.97)) and 11/12-year-olds (M = -5.44; p = .004) while the latter two did not 
differ (p = 1.00).  
When we focused on the raw scores of the unrelated items, we found that the 
older children had statistically higher unrelated scores than the adults (F(2, 82) = 
4.01, p = .02, ŋ²p = .09). 
DRM Task 
Hit rates 
 Memory discrimination. We also examined how participants performed on 
the DRM paradigm.  A 3(Age: 6/7-year-olds vs. 11/12-year-olds vs. adults) x 
2(Valence: negative vs. neutral) repeated measures ANOVA on the transformed DRM 
hits yielded a statistically significant Age effect (F(2, 82) = 9.83, p < .001, ŋ²p = .19).  
Post-hoc analyses showed that for both types of lists, adults (M = 3.49) had 
statistically higher discrimination values than 11/12- (M = 1.40) and 6/7-year-olds  (M 
= 1.32; p = .001). The two child groups did not statistically differ (p = 1.00). All other 
effects were not statistically significant (Table 6).  
Bias. No statistical effects emerged (all ps > .05; Table 7).  
False memory 
 Memory discrimination. An analysis of the discrimination values of the 
critical non-presented items showed a significant Age x Valence interaction (F(2, 82) 
= 6.87, p = .002, ŋ²p = .14).  Additional analyses revealed the following.  First, for 
both types of lists, false memories increased with age, with adults and 11/12-year-olds 
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having higher discrimination values than the youngest age group (ps < .05). Adults 
and 11/12-year-olds also differed in their level of false memory susceptibility (p = 
.04).  Second, we found that negative false memories were more likely to be produced 
in 6/7- and 11/12-year-olds relative to neutral false memories  (ps < .01).  For adults, 
this difference was not significant (p = .34; Table 6)  
 Bias. A statistical Age x Valence interaction was found (F(2, 82) = 6.87, p = 
.002, ŋ²p = .14).  Simple effects showed that bias scores for negative false memories 
were less liberal in 6/7- and 11/12-year-olds relative to bias scores for neutral false 
memories  (ps < .01).  For adults, this difference was not significant (p = .34; Table 
7).  
False alarms for related and unrelated non-presented items  
 Memory discrimination. Analyses of the non-presented related items 
revealed a significant valence effect (F(1, 82) = 31.21, p < .001, ŋ²p = .28) with higher 
discrimination values for the negative related items than for the neutral related items. 
All other effects were not statistically significant.  
 Bias. A significant Age effect was observed (F(2, 82) = 7.48, p < .001, ŋ²p = 
.15) with post-hoc tests showing that only adults (M = -5.48) had statistically more 
liberal bias scores than the 11/12-year-olds (M = -2.45; p = .001). We also found a 
Valence effect (F(1, 82) = 25.61, p < .001, ŋ²p = .23) with more liberal bias scores for 
the neutral than the negative related items. The interaction was not significant.  
When we analyzed the unrelated items, we found that the older children (M = 
0.23, SD = 0.16) had statistically higher unrelated scores than the adults (M = 0.09, 
SD = 0.08; F(2, 82) = 7.07, p < .001, ŋ²p = .15). 
Misinformation-DRM Correlational Analyses 
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 Finally, we were interested in whether DRM false memories would be related 
to suggestion-based false memories. The correlations in all experiments were 
computed on discrimination scores. Interestingly, a partial correlational analysis in 
which we looked at four correlations (correlations between DRM and video false 
memories) and in which we controlled for age found that neutral DRM false 
memories were statistically related to neutral and negative suggestion-induced false 
memories, respectively (r = .24, p = .03; r = .38, p < .001). Likewise, we found that 
negative DRM false memories were statistically related to neutral and negative 
suggestion-induced false memories (r = .24, p = .03; r = .23, p = .04). 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment showed that developmental reversals do exist in 
suggestion-based false memories.  Specifically, when certain theoretically prescribed 
conditions pertain (i.e., when critical items in a misinformation paradigm are 
semantically related to the presented items during the study phase), suggestion-
induced false memories increased with age.  That is, we found that memory 
discrimination increased with age, a clear developmental reversal effect. This pattern 
was most evident for the negative suggestion-based false memories.  Although 
suggestion-based false memories for neutral videos also increased with age, this 
increase fell short of significance.  Thus, like the spontaneous DRM-based false 
memories in this experiment, suggestion-based false memories were more likely in 
older children and adults than in younger children. 
 In the current design, we ensured that during the study phase, participants 
encountered details that were associatively related to non-presented critical items.  
Then, during the misinformation phase, misinformation was presented about these 
non-presented critical items.  When participants subsequently received a recognition 
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task, older children and adults were more likely to associatively relate these critical 
items with the originally presented items in the videos than the younger children.  
This resulted in a developmental reversal of the usual trend in suggestibility research, 
one that showed that older children and adults were more likely to develop 
suggestion-based false memories than younger children.  
 For both the negative and neutral videos, however, we did not find that this 
reversal continued into adulthood.  Specifically, in the negative video, we found no 
differences between 11/12-year-olds’ and adults’ false memory levels and for the 
neutral video we found that adults’ false memory levels were lower than the 11/12-
year-olds’ false memory rates.  For the negative video, our findings are in line with 
our DRM findings in that older children and adults did not differ in their false 
memory propensity.  A possible reason for not finding a difference between 11/12-
year-olds and adults is that children of this age activate related concepts in as rapid 
and automatic a manner as adults.  
As mentioned, for the neutral video, we found that adults’ false memory rates 
were reduced compared to 11/12-year-olds’ false memory rates.  There are other 
studies showing that adults’ false memory rates can be lower than children’s (Otgaar 
et al., 2012; Wimmer & Howe, 2010).  Although speculative, researchers have noted 
that these age discrepancies in false memory formation might be tied to individual and 
population variations in false memory vulnerability (Bouwmeester & Verkoeijen, 
2010).  Despite these discrepancies, we still found that under circumstances that 
primarily rely on gist extraction (FTT) or associative activation (AAT), both 
spontaneous and suggestion-based false memories follow a positive monotonic 
trajectory between younger and older children.  
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Also, at a descriptive level, neutral false memory rates were slightly higher 
than negative false memories in young children.  So, although all participants 
perceived the negative video as statistically more negative than the neutral one, this 
did not translate in statistically higher false memory rates for the negative video as 
what would be expected (Howe et al., 2010).  One possibility is that associative 
networks for these videos differed between age group and that younger children had a 
more extensive knowledge base for the neutral than the negative video.  Therefore, 
additional studies should examine whether participants’ knowledge base might vary 
between different types of emotional material.  
However, although our DRM lists were specifically constructed to differ with 
regard to valence, our videos could have differed in terms of arousal.  This is 
important because we know that arousal also drives changes in false memory rates 
(e.g., Brainerd et al., 2011).  There are also other dimensions that might have differed 
between our videos (e.g., relatedness, familiarity) that could have potentially affected 
our results. It is therefore relevant to urge caution when interpreting our emotional 
false memory effects.  To circumvent this issue,, for our next second experiment, we 
opted to include only the negative video.   
Interestingly, we found that both negative and neutral DRM false memories 
were positively related to the development of both negative and neutral suggestion-
based false memories.  This implies that similar processes, such as associative 
activation, are involved in developmental trends in both domains.  Up until now, 
developmental studies linking DRM false memories with false memories for more 
complex realistic events have not been conducted (see Brainerd et al., 2008).  
Although there are studies that have found positive correlations between DRM false 
memories and false memories for autobiographical events in children and adults (e.g., 
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Otgaar et al., 2012), these studies are somewhat limited.  Our study presents a hitherto 
unreported finding suggesting that whatever the type of false memory (e.g., 
spontaneous or suggestion-induced) similar endogenous processes seem to play a role 
in developmental patterns of these false memories.  
We also explored whether our effects might interact with the type of detail 
(peripheral vs. central).  The reason behind this is that for emotional events 
particularly, central details are better remembered than peripheral details (Thijssen, 
Otgaar, Meijer, Smeets, & de Ruiter, 2012).  However, in our experiment, 
developmental reversal effects were observed for both types of detail thereby 
demonstrating the robustness of this developmental reversal effect.   
Experiment 2 
Because the results of Experiment 1 provide novel yet tentative evidence 
showing developmental reversals in suggestion-induced false memories with 
meaning-connected stimuli, we attempted to replicate these results in a new sample 
using a more straightforward procedure.  To begin, because adults did not differ 
significantly from older children in terms of false memory propensity, we only 
included children in Experiment 2 and added an extra group of younger 4- to 6-year-
olds.  Because this latter group has often been found to be highly vulnerable to 
suggestive influences (Ceci & Bruck, 1993), it was important to see whether 
developmental reversals occurred at this younger age.  Second, because our 
developmental effects seemed to be more pronounced for the negative than neutral 
video, we only used the negative video in this experiment.  Third, because we 
obtained significant developmental reversals in the misinformation condition (as 
predicted), we eliminated the control condition in which no misinformation was 
presented.  
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Participants 
 Seventy participants were involved in this experiment (4/6-year-olds: n = 18, 
mean age = 4.83, SD = 0.44, range 4-6; 7/9-year-olds: n = 21, mean age = 7.33, SD = 
0.78, range 7-9; 10/12-year-olds: n = 31, mean age = 10.81, SD = 0.65, range 10-12). 
A power analysis with a power of 0.80 and a medium effect size (ŋ²partial = 0.13) 
resulted in a sample size of 69.  Data collection was terminated after 70 children 
received consent to participate.  We tested an extra participant in case children 
dropped out of the experiment. The goal was to test equal numbers of children in each 
age group, but the number of children was based on obtaining parental consent (and 
hence we had an unequal number of children in the groups). We stopped data 
collection when our total desired sample size was met. Children’s parents had 
provided consent for their child’s participation in the study and all children assented 
on the day of participation. All children received a small present for their 
participation.  The study was approved by the standing ethical committee of the 
Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience at Maastricht University. 
Design  
 The current experiment made use of a 3(Age: 4/6-year-olds vs. 7/9-year-olds 
vs. 10/12-year-olds) x 2(Detail: central vs. peripheral) split-plot design with the latter 
factor being within participant.  
Materials 
  We used the exact same negative video, misinformation (negative),DRM lists, 
and DRM recognition task as in Experiment. The only exception was the recognition 
task for the video.  
Recognition task for the video.  Our recognition task was also audio taped 
and consisted of 24 correct items, 6 critical items, 6 non-presented related items, and 
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24 non-presented unrelated items. Items on the recognition task were presented at a 5-
second rate. Responses were recorded by the experimenter. 
Procedure  
Children were tested individually in rooms at their primary school.  They 
received either the video (misinformation paradigm) or the DRM word lists (DRM 
paradigm) first. We counterbalanced the order of the presentation of the stimuli within 
each paradigm.  A similar procedure was used as in Experiment 1 except that all 
participants received misinformation about the video.  
Results 
As in Experiment 1, all scores on the video and DRM procedure were 
transformed using memory discrimination (d’) and response bias (c).  All data 
((un)corrected Video and DRM Tasks) are reported in Tables 8-13 (Video and DRM 
Tasks). 
Video Task 
Hit rates 
 Memory discrimination. When we performed a 3(Age: 4/6-year-olds vs. 7/9-
year-olds vs. 10/12-year-olds) x 2(Detail: central vs. peripheral) repeated measures 
ANOVA, we found no significant interaction (F(2, 66) = 1.14, p = .87, ŋ²p = .004), no 
significant effect for detail (F(1, 66) = 0.01, p = .92, ŋ²p = .00), but there was a 
significant age effect (F(2, 66) = 6.34, p = .003, ŋ²p = .16).  Post-hoc tests revealed 
that the only 10/12-year-olds (M = 7.73) had statistically higher memory 
discrimination rates relative to the youngest child group (M = 5.29; p = .004; Table 9)  
Bias. No statistical effects emerged when performed analyses on the response 
bias scores (all ps > .05; Table 10).  
False memory  
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 Memory discrimination. An analysis of the false memory rates did not reveal 
a significant interaction (F(2, 66) = 1.42, p = .25, ŋ²p = .04) but we did find a 
statistically significant age effect (F(2, 66) = 7.61, p = .001, ŋ²p = .19).  As in 
Experiment 1, we found a developmental reversal effect. That is, 10/12-year-olds (M 
= 6.94) and 7/9-year-olds  (M = 6.16) had statistically higher memory discrimination 
values than the 4/6-year-olds (M = 3.50; ps < .05).  Results also demonstrated a 
significant main effect of detail (F(1, 66) = 14.26, p < .001, ŋ²p = .18) with 
discrimination values being higher for peripheral false items than for central false 
items (see Table 9). 
Bias. When we performed an analysis on the response bias scores, we only 
found a statistically reliable Detail effect (F(1, 66) = 12.73, p = .001, ŋ²p = .16) with 
bias values being less liberal for peripheral than central false items. All other effects 
were not statistically significant (Table 10).  
False alarms for related and unrelated non-presented items 
When we conducted our analyses for non-presented (un)related items, no 
statistically significant effects emerged.  
DRM task 
Hit rates 
Memory discrimination. A repeated measures ANOVA on the discrimination 
values of the hit rates revealed a statistically significant effect of valence (F(1, 66) = 
9.76, p = .003, ŋ²p = .13).  Specifically, discrimination values were higher for the 
negative than neutral presented items. All other effects were not statistically 
significant (Table 12).  
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Bias. Again, we only found a statistically significant Valence effect (F(1, 66) 
= 8.75, p = .004, ŋ²p = .12) with less liberal bias scores for the negative than neutral 
presented items (Table 13).  
False memory 
 Memory discrimination. We also performed an analysis on the 
discrimination values of the false memory rates.  We found no significant interaction 
(F(2, 66) = 1.19, p = .31, ŋ²p =.04) but we did find a developmental reversal effect 
(F(2, 66) = 8.33, p = .001, ŋ²p = .20).  Post-hoc analyses showed that the 10/12-year-
olds (M = 3.93) had significantly higher false memory rates than the 7/9-year-olds (M 
= 1.87; p = .02) and the 4/6-year-olds (M = 1.07; p = .001).  The 7/9-year-olds and 
4/6-year-olds did not differ statistically in terms of false memory propensity (p = 
1.00).  We also found that negative false memories had higher bias scores than neutral 
false memories (F(1, 66) = 11.64, p = .001, ŋ²p = .15; Table 12).  
Bias. When we focused our analysis on the bias scores, we found that 10/12-
year-olds (M = 3.14) had statistically more conservative bias scores than the 7/9- (M = 
.62; p = .002) and 4/6-year-olds (M = .08; p < .001; F(2, 66) = 11.03, p < .001, ŋ²p = 
.25). Furthermore, we found that bias scores were more conservative for the negative 
than neutral critical items (F(1, 66) = 32.79, p < .001, ŋ²p = .33; Table 13). 
False alarms for related and unrelated non-presented items 
Memory discrimination. An analysis of the d’ values of the non-presented 
related items revealed no significant interaction (F(2, 66) = 1.32, p = .27, ŋ²p = .04).  
We did find that negative related items had higher discrimination scores than neutral 
related items (F(1, 66) = 5.80, p = .02, ŋ²p = .08). No age effect was detected (F(2, 66) 
= 0.12, p = .89, ŋ²p = .004). 
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Bias. We only found that negative related items had lower liberal bias scores 
than neutral related items (F(1, 66) = 6.02, p = .02, ŋ²p = .08). 
No statistical effects emerged for the unrelated items (F(2, 66) = .65, p = .52, 
ŋ²p = .02). 
Misinformation-DRM Correlational Analyses  
 We were also interested in whether suggestion-based false memories were 
associated with the DRM illusion.  When performing four partial correlational 
analyses controlling for age, we found that negative (r = .32, p = .001) DRM false 
memories were statistically related to the central suggestion-based false memories.  
Discussion 
The primary goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate the findings from 
Experiment 1 with younger children.  That is, we wanted to show that suggestion-
based false memories increased with age when there was an emphasis on 
associatively related meaning-based processing.  This experiment showed 
convincingly that this developmental reversal did occur with very young children 
when using a video-misinformation experiment. Indeed, again, we found that memory 
discrimination scores increased with age and the same pattern was evident for the 
untransformed scores. Together with Experiment 1, our results demonstrate that when 
suggestion-based false memories rely on spreading activation among associatively 
related concepts (and themes) that developmental reversals occur in a manner similar 
to that found for children’s spontaneous false memories.  
Of course, one might argue that our findings are limited inasmuch as we used 
the same materials in both of our experiments.  In order to demonstrate that our 
findings are not confined to these materials and that they can be replicated using other 
video-material, we conducted two additional experiments.  Because our findings 
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suggest that negative stimuli resulted in stronger developmental reversals than neutral 
material, we decided to only use a new negative video, one that is also relevant in 
forensic settings.  Again, we had to pilot this new material using a situational gist 
task.  We also explored whether the presentation of different types of misinformation 
affected the developmental reversal effect.  That is, in Experiments 3 and 4, we not 
only presented misinformation in the form of eyewitness testimony as in our previous 
experiments, but for half of the participants we also presented the same 
misinformation during a suggestive interview.  We did this because previous studies 
have found that children are more susceptible to misinformation than adults if it is 
delivered by authority figures (e.g., adults), particularly in an interview setting (see 
Ceci & Bruck, 1993).  
Thus, in these final two experiments, participants could receive one of two 
versions of misinformation.  As before, half of the participants were presented with 
misinformation in the form of another person’s eyewitness testimony.   Recall that 
this minimizes the impact of direct social influences on false memory formation (i.e., 
there is no authority asking suggestive questions) and hence, we anticipated 
developmental reversals in this group.  In the other group, the exact same 
misinformation was presented but in the form of an interview with the participants.  
Here, because participants were confronted with misinformation in a social context, 
one might not expect developmental reversals.  This is because such a context 
includes suggestive pressure by an authority, something that might lead to the 
standard developmental trends in suggestion-induced false memories (i.e., an age-
related decrease in false memories).  
Experiment 3 
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For this experiment, a pilot study was conducted to develop new material.  
Participants received critical cue words (e.g., pistol, money) and they had to come up 
with related response items to these words.  Like Experiment 1, we used adult 
undergraduates from the psychology faculty of Maastricht University in this pilot 
study because, as mentioned, previous research has shown that even if materials are 
normed specifically for children, developmental patterns of false memory formation 
are still quite robust (e.g., Metzger et al., 2008).  The reponse items produced by 
adults were then used to construct a video of a bank robbery in which the critical cue 
words were not included in the video. 
 For this pilot task, we again used a situational gist task where participants had 
to provide as many related response items as they could to each of a number of 
critical cue words in a single context, namely, a bank robbery.  These related response 
items were then used for the construction of the video.  There were 38 participants 
(mean age = 28, SD = 3.56; 20 male) who each received a booklet in which 10 critical 
cue words were mentioned (e.g., pistol, money, laptop).  For the entire task, they were 
given 15 min. to produce as many related items as they could. The exact instruction 
for the bank robbery scene was: “A bank is being robbed by an armed man. Try to 
come up with as many items (minimum of 5) that are related to this event.”  
 The participants collectively produced many related response items (N = 
1773).  Of the 10 critical cue words, 5 were selected for which participants produced 
the most related response items (i.e., pistol, money, laptop, brochures, numberticket-
dispensor).  For each of the 5 critical cue words we selected the 5 related items that 
were produced most often by participants.  For example, for the critical cue word 
pistol, participants most often mentioned the following related response items: loud 
noise, criminal, bullets, black clothing, and balaclava.  These related response items 
Development of False Memories 35 
were included in the eventual video of the bank robbery and the critical cue words 
were left out of the video. Central critical cue words that were used as misinformation 
were pistol and money and peripheral cue words were laptop, brochures, 
numberticket-dispensor.  This video was then used as part of a misinformation 
paradigm in which we examined whether this new material would change the usual 
developmental trend in suggestion-induced false memories and whether it would lead 
to the same developmental reversals in suggestion-based false memories as our first 
two experiments.  
Method 
Participants 
 In this study, 44 7/8-year-olds (mean age = 7.16, SD = 0.37; range 7-8; 23 
boys) and 42 adult participants (mean age = 20.79, SD = 2.60; range 18-28; 6 men) 
were involved.  A power analysis with a power of 0.80 and a medium effect size 
(ŋ²partial = 0.13) resulted in a sample size of 84 (Faul et al., 2007).  As 44 children 
received parental consent to participate, we stopped with data collection after testing a 
total of 86 participants. These age groups were selected because they differ 
significantly in terms of false memory propensity (Brainerd et al., 2008).  Children 
were recruited from elementary schools and could only participate if they received 
parental consent and assented on the day of testing.  Children received a small present 
for their involvement.  Adults were undergraduates from the Faculty of Psychology 
and Neuroscience and the Faculty of Health, Medicine, and Life Sciences. They 
received a monetary award (7.50 euro) or course credits for their participation.  The 
study was approved by the standing ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology 
and Neuroscience at Maastricht University. 
Materials 
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Misinformation. Misinformation was presented in two forms: as an 
eyewitness account or in an interview.  The eyewitness account was audiotaped and 
played back to the participants.  The eyewitness mentioned the 5 critical items and 20 
old items from the original video that were related to the critical items (for each 
critical item, 4 related items were presented from the original video).  In the other 
version, participants were subjected to a short interview in which they were asked 25 
questions.  Five questions contained misinformation including the not-presented 
critical items (e.g., “What was the color of the pistol of the bank robber?”).  The other 
20 questions pertained to old items that were presented during the video (e.g., “Was 
the color of the balaclava the same as his jacket?”).  Participants were asked to 
respond to each question and had to guess if they did not know the answer.  
Recognition task for the video. The 50-item recognition task consisted of 5 
critical items, 20 presented items (4 presented for each critical item), 5 related but 
not-presented items (1 for each critical item), and 20 unrelated but not-presented 
items. Items on the recognition task were presented at a 5-second rate. Responses 
were recorded by the experimenter. 
DRM lists. Participants heard 5 negative DRM word lists each containing 10 
words. These were the same negative DRM lists as in Experiments 1 and 2. The 
words were related to critical lures that were the non-presented items (e.g., death, 
punishment).  These lists have proven to effectively elicit spontaneous false memories 
(Howe et al., 2010; Otgaar et al., 2010).  
 Recognition task for the DRM lists. The 45-item recognition task consisted 
of 5 critical lures, 20 presented items (4 from each list), 5 related but not-presented 
items (1 for each critical lure), and 15 unrelated but not-presented items. The 
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recognition task was presented at a 5-second rate for each item. Responses were 
recorded by the experimenter. 
Design and Procedure  
 We used a 2(Age: 7/8-year-olds vs. adults) x 2(Condition: eyewitness account 
vs. interview) x 2(Detail: central vs. peripheral) mixed design with the latter factor 
being within participant.  Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions 
(Eyewitness account: 21 children and 21 adults; Interview: 23 children and 21 adults).   
 Children were tested in quiet rooms at their schools and adults’ test sessions 
took place in lab rooms at the university.  Participants were told that they would 
witness a video and that certain questions were going to be asked about the video.  
Participants then had to look at the video.  After this, a 2-minute filler task (underline 
the letters R and P on a piece of text) was presented to participants.  Next, participants 
received misinformation in the form of an eyewitness account or a suggestive 
interview.  One day later, participants received the recognition test for the video.  This 
final stage happened after a day in which participants’ memory was tested for the 
event because misinformation effects are stronger after a delay (Higham, 1998).  
Following this, participants studied 5 DRM lists, were given a 2-minute filler task, 
and were then given the DRM recognition task.  
Results 
Video task 
Hit rates 
Memory discrimination. Data were transformed as in the previous 
experiments. All data are reported in Tables 14-19 (Video and DRM Tasks).  A 
2(Age: 7/8-year-olds vs. adults) x 2(Condition: eyewitness account vs. interview) x 
2(Detail: central vs. peripheral) ANOVA was conducted on the corrected hit rates.  A 
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statistically significant three-way interaction was obtained (F(1, 83) = 12.77, p = .001,  
ŋ²partial = .13). Simple effects analyses revealed that for the interview, a statistically 
significant Age effect was observed (F(1, 83) = 13.63, p = .001,  ŋ²partial = .25) for the 
central items with higher discrimination values for the adults than children. This 
effect was absent in the eyewitness account condition (F(1, 83) = 1.50, p = .23,  
ŋ²partial = .04). For the peripheral items, there was a statistically significant Age effect 
(F(1, 83) = 20.57, p < .001,  ŋ²partial = .20) with adults having elevated d’ values 
relative to children (Table 15).  
Bias. For the bias scores, we again found a statistically reliable three-way 
interaction (F(1, 83) = 13.01, p = .001,  ŋ²partial = .14). Follow-up tests showed the 
following. For the central items, bias scores were more conservative in children than 
in adults, but only in the eyewitness condition (F(1, 42) = 4.64, p = .04,  ŋ²partial = .10). 
For the interview condition, this was not statistically significant. For the peripheral 
items, there was a general statistical Age effect (F(1, 83) = 4.24, p = .04,  ŋ²partial = 
.05) with children having lower liberal bias scores than adults (Table 16).  
False memory 
 Memory discrimination. When we performed similar analyses on the d’ 
values of the false recognition rates (critical items), the following results emerged.  
Here, we found a statistically significant Age x Detail interaction (F(1, 83) = 6.44, p = 
.01,  ŋ²partial = .07).  As expected, our results showed that the standard developmental 
trend in suggestion-induced false memories was significantly altered such that it 
resulted in a developmental reversal effect when misinformation was introduced. 
Specifically, simple effect analyses found the following. For peripheral items, we 
found that children were less vulnerable to misinformation than adults (F(1, 85) = 
5.63, p = .02; ŋ²partial = .06), a finding that illustrates a developmental reversal effect.  
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For the central items, the results showed no developmental differences between 
children’s and adults’ false memory propensity (F(1, 83) = 1.89, p = .17), illustrating 
an attenuation of the usual developmental pattern in suggestion-induced false 
memories (Table 15).  
Bias. Our analysis only revealed a statistically significant Age x Detail 
interaction significant (F(1, 83) = 5.25, p = .03,  ŋ²partial = .06). Additional tests found 
that only for the peripheral critical items, bias scores were statistically more 
conservative in children than in adults (F(1, 83) = 4.24, p = .04; ŋ²partial = .05). This 
difference was not statistically significant for the central critical items (F(1, 85) = 
0.61, p = .44; ŋ²partial = .01l Table 16).   
False alarms for related and unrelated non-presented items 
Memory discrimination. We also looked at d’ values of related and unrelated 
items.  We found a statistically significant Age effect (F(1, 83) = 5.87, p = .02, ŋ²partial 
= .07) with adults (M = 2.78) having higher discrimination scores than children (M = 
1.18). Our analysis also found that discrimination scores were higher for the central 
than peripheral related items (F(1, 83) = 18.22, p < .001, ŋ²partial = .18).  
Bias. Our analysis found statistically lower liberal bias scores for children (M 
= -4.45) than adults (M = -6.26; F(1, 83) = 6.20, p = .02; ŋ²partial = .07), Furthermore, 
lower liberal bias scores were found for the central than peripheral related items (F(1, 
83) = 17.02, p < .001; ŋ²partial = .17), 
For the unrelated items, we found that children had statistically higher false 
alarm rates than adults (F(1, 83) = 10.54, p = .002,  ŋ²partial = .11).  
DRM task 
Hit rates 
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 Memory discrimination. We conducted an ANOVA on the discrimination 
scores for the DRM lists.  This analysis showed a statistically significant age effect 
(F(1, 85) = 16.05, p < .001,  ŋ²partial = .16) where adults (M = 4.42) had higher scores 
than children (M = 2.28; F(1, 85) = 5.63, p = .02; ŋ²partial = .06; Table 18),  
Bias. No statistical effects emerged (Table 19).  
False memory 
 Memory discrimination. Analyses of false memories showed the standard 
developmental reversal effect (F(1, 85) = 25.38, p < .001,  ŋ²partial = .23) with adults 
having higher discrimination scores than children (Table 18). .  
 Bias. We found that adults had more conservative bias scores than children 
(F(1, 85) = 7.39, p = .008; ŋ²partial = .08; Table 19),  
False alarms for related and unrelated non-presented items 
Memory discrimination. For related items, we also found that adults (M = 
.43) had higher acceptance rates than children (M = -1.36; F(1, 85) = 5.75, p = .02,  
ŋ²partial = .06).   
Bias. No statistical effects emerged.  
For unrelated items, false alarm rates were statistically higher for children than 
adults (F(1, 85) = 21.50, p < .001,  ŋ²partial = .20).  
Misinformation-DRM Correlational Analyses  
 When we examined whether video false memories were related to DRM false 
memories, three partial correlational analyses (controlling for age) showed that video 
false memories for the peripheral items were statistically related to DRM false 
memories (r = 0.29, p = .006).  
Discussion 
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Once again, our findings from Experiment 3 provide clear evidence that using 
our meaning-modified misinformation paradigm results in reversals of the usual 
developmental trends in suggestion-induced false memories.  That is, when children 
and adults were confronted with stimuli containing meaningful, associatively-related 
details, and were subsequently presented with associatively related misinformation 
(preserving the meaning of the event) about critical, non-presented items, children 
were less prone to accepting that misinformation than adults, at least for peripheral 
information.  Although we had no strong predictions concerning developmental trends 
for false memories for central and peripheral items, we did find an attenuation (central 
items) and a reversal (peripheral items) of suggestion-induced false memory 
development. Specifically, our analysis showed that as expected, when exposed to 
misinformation, children were not the most vulnerable to false memories and were 
sometimes the least vulnerable.  
Because developmental reversals in suggestion-induced false memories 
represents a relatively new field of scientific inquiry, we conducted Experiment 4 in 
an attempt to further replicate our previous findings (see e.g., Simons, 2014) as well 
as see whether developmental reversals can be produced for both central and 
peripheral items.  In order to examine this, we tested a larger age span and now 
specifically focused on development trends in false memories in children.  That is, we 
tested 4/5-year-olds, 7/8-year-olds, and 11/12-year-olds.  We did not test adult 
participants in this study because false memory formation is often not different 
between 11/12-year-olds and adults (Otgaar et al., 2014).  
Experiment 4 
 Participants 
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 In this experiment, we included 52 4/5-year-olds (mean age = 4.60, SD = 0.50; 
range 4-5; 26 boys), 55 7/8-year-olds (mean age = 7.62, SD = 0.50; range: 7-8; 29 
boys), and 51 11/12-year-olds (mean age = 11.51, SD = 0.51; range: 11-12; 24 boys).  
A power analysis resulted in a sample size of 68 participants.  All children had 
parental consent and received a small present for their involvement.  We received 
parental and school consent to test 158 children and hence, tested all children.  
Although equal numbers of children in each group were desired, consent for child 
participation meant in that the numbers of children differed somewhat in each age 
group. The study was approved by the standing ethical committee of the Faculty of 
Psychology and Neuroscience at Maastricht University. 
Materials 
 The exact same materials were used here as in Experiment 3. 
Design and Procedure 
 We used a 3(Age: 4/5-year-olds, 7/8-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds) x 
2(Condition: eyewitness account vs. interview) x 2(Detail: central vs. peripheral) 
mixed design with the latter factor constituting a within-participant variable.  
Participants were randomly assigned to the different conditions (Eyewitness account: 
27 4/5-year-olds, 29 7/8-year-olds, 26 11/12-year-olds; Interview: 25 4/5-year-olds, 
26 7/8-year-olds, 25 11/12-year-olds).  A similar procedure was implemented as in 
Experiment 3.  
Results  
Video task 
Hit rates 
Memory discrimination. Data were transformed as in the previous 
experiments (see Tables 20-25 for the Video and DRM data).  We conducted a 3(Age: 
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4/5-year-olds, 7/8-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds) x 2(Condition: eyewitness account vs. 
interview) x 2(Detail: central vs. peripheral) ANOVA on hit rates. A statistically 
significant Age effect was detected (F(2, 144) = 23.37, p < .001, ŋ²partial = .25). Post-
hoc comparisons showed that 4/5-year-olds (M = 2.72) had statistically lower 
discrimination scores than the 7/8- (M = 5.97) and 11/12-year-olds (M = 2.72; all ps < 
.001). We also found a significant Detail effect with central items having higher 
values than peripheral ones (F(1, 144) = 46.09, p < .001, ŋ²partial = .24). All other 
effects were not statistically significant (Table 21).  
 Bias. We only found a statistically significant Detail effect with the most 
conservative bias scores for the central items (F(1, 144) = 45.00, p < .001, ŋ²partial = 
.24; Table 22). 
False memory 
 Memory discrimination. No significant three-way interaction emerged (F(2, 
148) = 1.06, p = .35, ŋ²partial = .01).  However, as predicted, we found a developmental 
reversal effect. That is, a statistically significant Age x Detail interaction emerged 
(F(2, 148) = 6.45, p = .002; ŋ²partial = .08) where simple effects analyses revealed that 
for both central and peripheral items, false memories increased with age (central: F(2, 
149) = 10.33, p < .001; ŋ²partial = .12;  peripheral: F(2, 148) = 21.19, p < .001; ŋ²partial = 
.22).  However, for central items, 4/5-year-olds and 11/12-year-olds did not differ in 
terms of false memory rates (p = .052) although this effect was significant for 4/5-
year-olds and 7/8-year-olds (p < .001).  For the peripheral items, false memories 
increased with age with 4/5-year-olds having lower false memory rates than 7/8-year-
olds and 11/12-year-olds (ps <.001). All other effects were not statistically significant 
(see Table 21). 
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Bias. For bias scores, the analysis also demonstrated a significant Age x Detail 
interaction (F(2, 148) = 6.33, p = .002, ŋ²partial = .08). Follow-up tests revealed that for 
both central and peripheral critical items, an Age effect was observed (central: F(2, 
149) = 3.39, p = .04, ŋ²partial = .04; F(2, 148) = 4.62, p = .01, ŋ²partial = .06). However, 
for central critical items, post-hoc comparisons showed that only the 4/5-year-olds 
and 7/8-year-olds differed somewhat in their bias scores; albeit not significant (p = 
.054). For peripheral critical items, 11/12-year-olds had more conservative bias scores 
than the youngest age group (p = .01).  All other effects were not significant (Table 
22).  
False alarms for related and unrelated non-presented items 
Memory discrimination. For d’ values of the related items, we only found 
that 4/5-year-olds (M = 1.04) had lower discrimination values than the 11/12-year-
olds (M = 1.56; F(2, 145) = 3.47, p = 0.03; ŋ²partial = .05).  We also found that central 
related items were better recognized than peripheral related items (F(1, 145) = 21.15, 
p < .001; ŋ²partial = .13).  All other effects were not significant.  
Bias. We found that only the youngest children (M = -2.46) had statistically 
lower liberal bias scores than the 11/12-year-olds (M = -4.90; F(2, 145) = 5.60, p = 
.005, ŋ²partial = .07). Our analysis also showed that bias scores were less liberal for 
central than peripheral related items (F(1, 145) = 20.98, p < .001, ŋ²partial = .13). All 
other effects were not significant.  
For the unrelated items, 4/5-year-olds had statistically higher false alarm rates 
than 7/8-year-old sand 11/12-year-olds  (F(2, 143) = 20.79, p < .001; ŋ²partial = .23).  
DRM task 
Hit rates 
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 Memory discrimination. A univariate ANOVA was performed on the d’ 
values of the DRM hit rates.  A statistically significant age effect emerged (F(2, 150) 
= 19.50, p < .001; ŋ²partial = .21).  Post-hoc tests showed that although 11/12-year-olds 
(M = 3.20) and 7/8-year-olds (M = 2.26) remembered more correct items than 4/5-
year-olds (M = .63; ps < .001), the difference between 7/8-year-olds and 11/12-year-
olds was not significant (p = .07; Table 24). 
Bias. A significant Age effect was observed (F(2, 150) = 9.62, p < .001, 
ŋ²partial = .11) showing that 4/5-year-olds (M = 1.48) had more conservative bias scores 
than the 7/8- (M = -.08) and 11/12-year-olds (M = -.34; ps < .002; Table 25). 
False memory 
 Memory discrimination. For d’ values of false memories we found a 
statistically significant main effect of age (F(2, 151) = 124.11, p < .001; ŋ²partial = .45).  
Post-hoc tests revealed a developmental reversal effect in that 11/12-year-olds (M = 
4.56) had higher false memory rates than 7/8-year-olds (M = 2.73) who in turn had 
higher false memory levels than 4/5-year-olds (M = .81; all ps < .05; Table 24).  
Bias. No age effect was found (Table 25).   
False alarms for related and unrelated non-presented items 
Memory discrimination. We found that 11/12-year-olds (M = .85) had higher 
discrimination values than 7/8-year-olds (M = -.80; F(2, 151) = 4.27, p = .01, ŋ²partial = 
.05).  
Bias. The youngest age group (M = .67) had more conservative bias scores 
than the 7/8-year-olds (M = -3.14) and 11/12-year-olds (M = -2.64; F(2, 151) = 13.39, 
p < .001, ŋ²partial = .15). 
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For the unrelated items, we found that the youngest group had statistically 
higher false alarm rates than the 7/8-year-olds and 11/12-year-olds (F(2, 151) = 43.59, 
p < .001; ŋ²partial = .37).  
Misinformation-DRM Correlational Analyses  
 Three partial correlational analyses (controlling for age) revealed that video 
false memories for central information were statistically related to the formation of 
DRM false memories (r = 0.19, p = .02).   
Discussion 
The findings of Experiment 4 again convincingly demonstrate that false 
memories in a suggestibility paradigm can increase with age under circumstances that 
focus on the meaning of an event.  In this experiment, we even found stronger 
evidence for a developmental reversal effect inasmuch as reversals were obtained for 
both central and peripheral details.  Of course, this occurred only when we included 
4/5-year-olds.  Moreover, in this study, we found that for both the interview and 
eyewitness account, susceptibility to misinformation increased with age.  
In both Experiments 3 and 4, we showed that when using new material, 
standard age-related trajectories in suggestion-induced false memories were 
attenuated or even reversed.  Although we found in Experiment 3 that this effect was 
most pronounced for the peripheral items, in Experiment 4, we found developmental 
reversal effects for both central and peripheral items, irrespective of misinformation 
condition (interview vs. eyewitness statements).  Although we expected that an 
interview would introduce elements of social pressure, we did not find that this 
altered developmental trends in suggestion-induced false memories.   
Cross-Experiment Analysis of Developmental Reversals 
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For each experiment, we identified how many developmental reversal effects 
for the video and DRM tasks were predicted and checked how many we found. For 
Experiment 1 (video task), we only predicted developmental reversals when 
misinformation was provided (n = 4; neutral-central, neutral-peripheral, negative-
central, negative-peripheral). We found reversal effects in all four of them. For the 
DRM task, we predicted two reversal effects (neutral and negative) and we also found 
reversals for both of them. For Experiment 2 (video task), we expected to find two 
reversal effects (central and peripheral) and reversal effects were found for both. For 
the DRM task, we expected two reversal effects (neutral and negative) and two were 
also detected. For Experiment 3 (video task), four developmental reversals were 
predicted (interview-central, interview-peripheral, eyewitness account-central, 
eyewitness account-peripheral), and we found evidence for two reversal effects 
(interview-central, interview-peripheral). For the other two, we found attenuation 
effects. For the DRM task, we expected one developmental reversal effect and we 
found evidence for this prediction. For Experiment 4 (video task), we expected four 
reversal effects (see Experiment 3) and we found evidence for all of them. For the 
DRM task, one reversal effect was predicted and this was also found. Taken together, 
for the video and DRM tasks, we find developmental reversal effects in 90% of the 
cases (18/20). If we only focus on the suggestion-induced false memories, then we 
find evidence for reversal effects in 86% (12/14) of the cases.  
General Discussion 
Our experiments were designed to answer a simple question: Does the typical 
developmental trend in suggestion-induced false memories (i.e., age-related decline in 
false memory) change when (associatively or semantically) related information is 
used as misinformation?  The answer is yes.  Four experiments showed that under 
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theoretically prescribed conditions (where misinformation is associatively related to 
the originally studied information) that older children and adults were more 
vulnerable to false memories than younger children.  That is, in contrast to the usual 
suggestibility effects in childhood, younger children were not more vulnerable to false 
memory production than older children and adults.  Indeed, we even found evidence 
for a developmental reversal effect in suggestion-based false memories.  That we 
found similar results in different age groups (4- to 12-year-olds and adults) reinforces 
the argument that under conditions in which people have to rely on thematic, 
associative activation, younger children are not more susceptible to false memories 
than older children and adults and are even sometimes the least vulnerable to false 
memory formation.  Moreover, across the four experiments we used a number of 
newly created materials and found evidence for changes in the typical developmental 
trend in suggestion-induced false memories across these materials.  
If we look more closely at the analyses of age effects in false memory across 
experiments (DRM and misinformation), we find that 90% (n = 18) of these analyses 
showed clear evidence for developmental reversals. If we only focus on the 
misinformation experiments, 86% (n = 12) show developmental reversal effects (see 
joint analysis). This clearly shows that our experiments were quite successful in 
demonstrating that when using meaning-connected material, developmental trends in 
children’s susceptibility to misinformation and false memories can be altered and can 
even be reversed so that they increase with age.  If we compare this with the overview 
of studies on developmental false memory effects (see Figure 1a), it is obvious that 
our experiments reveal the malleability of suggestion-based false memory 
development.   
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Importantly, we found that our developmental effects in suggestion-based 
false memories were found mainly in terms of false recognition of critical items. 
Similar developmental trends were less pronounced in other variables (e.g., related 
items). This is in line with previous research on developmental trends in spontaneous 
false memories (Brainerd et al., 2008) and reinforces our argument that our procedure 
specifically resulted in spreading activation to critical items and did not spill over 
onto less related items. Furthermore, our developmental reversal effects seemed to go 
hand in hand with younger children having lower hit rates than older children and 
adults, another standard finding in memory development research (Brainerd et al., 
2008).  
In Experiments 3 and 4, we also explored whether the presentation of different 
types of misinformation (social pressure in an interview format vs. eyewitness 
testimony) affected developmental trends in false memory differently. The reasoning 
behind this was that external influences such as social pressure might not load on any 
endogenous processes (associative activation, gist extraction) and hence, lead to the 
standard age-related decrease in suggestion-based false memories, In Experiments 3 
and 4, we found that both social pressure and eyewitness testimony led to 
developmental reversal effects. Of course, this issue warrants further examination, but 
it might imply that even social pressure is not a reliable predictor for causing younger 
children to assent more to misinformation than older children and adults. 
Links to Theories of Memory Development 
Our studies were derived in large measure from the tenets of AAT (Howe et 
al., 2009) and it turns out that our findings are consistent with this theory.  Recall that 
in AAT, false memories arise out of automatic associative activation in one’s 
knowledge base and that false memories increase with age because as one’s 
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knowledge base expands and is restructured (also see Ceci et al., 2007), spreading 
activation becomes more automatic (Howe et al., 2009).  The presentation of 
associatively-related information during the misinformation phase increased 
children’s associative activation resulting in either no differences between children’s 
and adults’ false memory rates or a developmental increase in false memories.  Thus, 
when misinformation included the related non-presented details, it was the older 
children (and adults) who were most likely to associate these details within their 
knowledge base and form false memories.  
Of course, it is important to acknowledge that other false memory theories are 
also able to explain the current findings.  For example, in FTT, developmental 
reversals in suggestion-induced false memories would be predicted when gist-related 
information was provided during the misinformation phase.  Because younger 
children were less likely to get the gist from the videos than older children (and 
adults), and when misinformation was provided that included the related non-
presented items, older children (and adults) were more likely to associate this with the 
presented details and developed more false memories than younger children.  
Another aim of the present research was to explore whether valence would 
interact with developmental trends in suggestion-induced false memories. That is, the 
affect-as-information hypothesis (Corson & Verrier, 2007) predicts that negative 
experiences do not lead as easily to false memories as positive ones because people 
attend more to item-specific details in negative events, something that lowers false 
memory production. However, both AAT and FTT assume that it is easier to extract 
the underlying meaning of negative events than more mundane (or positive) events, 
because negative events evoke networks of more strongly interrelated nodes. 
Information activation is therefore more likely to spread throughout networks of 
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negative than neutral material, increasing false memory rates. Indeed, we found that 
negative materials led to more false memories than neutral material and that younger 
children were less likely to produce false memories than older children and adults for 
both the neutral and negative material.  Thus, in line with the work on valence and 
DRM lists (Howe et al., 2010), our experiments also revealed that valence does not 
interact with developmental trends in suggestion-induced false memories. However, 
one should interpret our emotional false memory effects with caution as it is unclear 
whether our video material (in Experiment 1) differed in valence, arousal, or on even 
more dimensions (e.g., familiarity). Future studies could attempt to replicate the 
present findings with stimuli controlling for factors such as valence and arousal.  
Finally, our results are related to a developmental-representational theory that 
specifies that differences in mental representations of experiences drive memory 
development and that these differences explain reversals in memory development.  
One important discovery in this area concerns age improvements in metamemory 
(i.e., introspection of the contents of memory). This research has shown that 
metamemory abilities protect people from the acceptance of false information (Ghetti, 
2008).  Indeed, one might argue that falsely recognizing the critical lure during the 
recognition task could be due to poor source monitoring in that participants 
mistakenly recognize the critical lure as being part of the original event while it was 
presented as part of the misinformation.  It is true that misinformation effects are 
often explained in terms of source misattributions (e.g., Loftus, 2005).  However, 
poor source monitoring is unable to explain the developmental reversal effects found 
in the current experiments.  That is, research shows that younger children have poorer 
source monitoring abilities than older children and adults (Lindsay, Johnson, & 
Kwon, 1991).  Based on this, one would expect that younger children would be more 
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vulnerable to misinformation than older children and adults.  Because we found the 
opposite pattern in our experiments, it is likely that our results are better explained in 
terms of developmental changes in spreading activation, changes in knowledge base, 
or the ability to extract gist.  
Links to Other Studies of False Memory 
One may wonder whether our findings are novel. Developmental reversals 
have surfaced in several other memory paradigms besides the DRM paradigm 
(Candel, Memon, & Al-Harazi, 2007: memory conformity; Connolly & Price, 2006: 
suggestibility; Ceci et al., 2007:misinformation; Goswick, Mullet, & Marsh, 2013: 
stories; Lyons, Ghetti, & Cornoldi, 2010: causal narratives; Odegard, Cooper, 
Lampinen, Reyna, & Brainerd, 2009: group play; Otgaar & Smeets, 2010: survival 
processing; Principe, Gauiliano & Root, 2008: rumor-mongering; Ross et al., 2006: 
eyewitness identification; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004: categorized lists; see for an 
overview, Brainerd, 2013). For example, Candel and colleagues (2007) showed that in 
free recall, memory conformity effects were stronger in 11/12-year-olds than in 6/7-
year-olds. Also, Principe and colleagues (2008) found developmental reversal effects 
in a paradigm measuring rumor-mongering. Furthermore, Ross and colleagues found 
that adults made more identifications of an innocent bystander than children. 
However, there are several critical dimensions present in the current project that 
differentiates it from this previous research, making the present results novel.  
First, as seen earlier, research into developmental reversals in the 
misinformation paradigm is extremely limited and developmental reversals have not 
been extensively examined for implanted false memories (i.e., misinformation-based 
false memories). This is surprising as this paradigm has been at the heart of studies 
linking false memories with the legal arena. Indeed, the misinformation paradigm is 
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frequently regarded as one of the most important paradigms for studying false 
memories (Loftus, 2005). More importantly, none of the studies listed above followed 
the recommendations put forward by Brainerd and colleagues (2011) who suggested 
that researchers should study developmental reversals in the misinformation 
paradigm. That is, Brainerd and colleagues argued that developmental reversals in the 
misinformation paradigm can be revealed when children and adults receive material 
containing associatively-related details that are then presented with misinformation 
that preserves the underlying meaning of the event. We are the first using such a 
procedure and in line with theories as FTT and AAT, we find developmental reversal 
effects for suggestion-induced false memories. Second, and as has been articulated by 
Ceci et al. (2007) and Brainerd et al. (2011), the present findings are novel because 
they have been predicted from an a priori position and are closely based on theoretical 
mechanisms found in both FTT and AAT; something that has not been done before to 
the extent we have examined it in this article (see below).  
It is true that our findings are in line with Ceci et al.’s (2007) study in that 
these researchers also used an adapted misinformation paradigm. However, our 
experiments add new perspectives to this work. First, we extend Ceci et al.’s (2007) 
findings as we have used different and more forensically relevant (videos) materials, 
ones that also differed in emotion.  Second, we conducted four misinformation 
experiments using our adapted protocol and showed developmental reversals across 
all of them.  Indeed, these reversals in suggestion-induced false memories are quite 
robust, something that has not been demonstrated prior to the research reported in this 
article.  Third, reversals in suggestion-induced false memories have not been 
examined from an a priori perspective. Indeed, Ceci, Fitneva, and Williams (2010, p. 
465) acknowledge that work in this area is important because “[s]uch reversals, albeit 
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rare, present a serious challenge to theory, and past accounts of their occurrence have 
been post hoc and have not led to a priori predictions of when younger and older 
children’s performance will be similar or reversed.” Finally, in contrast to previous 
studies, a novel element of our experiments is that we compared false memories 
obtained with our new material with DRM false memories. In this way, we could 
check whether mechanisms underlying DRM false memories (i.e., associative 
activation) also played a role in the elicitation of suggestion-induced false memories. 
As expected, we found evidence that susceptibility to suggestion-induced false 
memory was positively linked to DRM false memory illusions, independent of age.  
The crucial message from the experiments presented here is that the 
assumption that children’s testimonial accuracy is necessarily inferior to that of 
adults’ is untenable.  Indeed, simply by changing the nature of the materials, we found 
that older children (and adults) produced more false memories than younger children.  
Thus, we have demonstrated that the validity of such an assumption depends on a 
number of considerations, ones that derive from theoretical principles concerning the 
role of meaning-connected information in events and how this information interacts 
with memory development generally and the formation of false memories 
specifically.   
The focus of our article was on an examination of developmental trajectories 
of suggestion-induced false memories that were grounded in semantic activation. Of 
course, this limits the generalizability of our findings to other false memories that are 
the result of external influences such as social pressure or forced confabulation. Also, 
one could argue that our findings are silent about developmental trends in false 
memories for autobiographical, real-life experiences.  Although this limitation needs 
to be taken seriously, there is evidence showing developmental reversal effects in 
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other eyewitness paradigms such as rumor-mongering and group conformity (e.g., 
Candel et al., 2007; Principe et al., 2008).  However, it is still important to be cautious 
about how far we can generalize our findings and acknowledge the continuing debate 
as to whether memory illusions based on semantic activation are related to other types 
of (false) memories (e.g., Gallo, 2010; Ost, Blank, Davies, Jones, Lambert, & 
Salmon, 2013; Otgaar, Verschuere, Meijer, & Van Oorsouw, 2012). 
Links to Other Domains 
 Our results have implications for domains other than memory development.  
For example, our experiments are in line with the accumulating body of research in 
cognitive development that is also showing that younger children sometimes 
outperform older children and adults.  Indeed, younger children are better at 
distinguishing foreign sounds than older children and adults (Kuhl, 2004; Werker, 
Yeung, & Yoshida, 2012). Also, younger children are superior in coming up with 
alternative ways to use tools than older children (Defeyter & German, 2003).  Finally, 
Gopnik et al. (2015) showed that unusual abstract causal principles were better 
learned by younger than older children.  
 A likely candidate for a common mechanism for these counterintuitive 
developmental patterns is age-related changes in one’s knowledge base. Indeed, 
according to Gopnik and colleagues (2015), acquiring new knowledge might result in 
being less flexible for new ideas. Furthermore, they reasoned that although a dense 
and well-integrated knowledge base might consist of many interrelated connections, 
these connections do not leave room for exploratory behavior. For the field of 
memory, our experiments show that such a dense and well-integrated knowledge base 
can also be disadvantageous because it gives rise to false recollections.  
Development of False Memories 56 
 The implication here is that more focus should be placed on understanding the 
role of knowledge base in developmental studies.  There are several specific areas that 
might benefit from such a focus. For example, in educational contexts, considerable 
weight is placed on learning new material and integrating it with one’s current 
knowledge base.  In order for this to occur, it would be useful to know the current 
status of students’ knowledge in order to tailor the new material so that it can be 
easily integrated when learning takes place (see also Roediger, 2013). Like Gopnik 
and colleagues (2015), it would be relevant to assess whether for certain concepts and 
tasks, older children experience more learning difficulties than younger children.  
Another area that might advance from a focus on one’s knowledge base is the 
forensic context. The lesson from the current experiments is that a child’s age can no 
longer be used as a predictor of their reliability as an eyewitness. Indeed, in many 
criminal cases, expert witnesses regularly (falsely) assume that young children are 
more apt to produce most kinds of memory errors, whether they arise spontaneously 
or due to suggestion-induced pressures (for a recent case, see Brackmann, Otgaar, 
Sauerland, & Jelicic, in press). However, there are perhaps other forensic 
ramifications of our findings. For example, although not done at present, one 
interesting possibility might be to examine whether the DRM paradigm (referring to 
one’s knowledge base) is a valid and reliable method of indexing a person’s 
susceptibility to form spontaneous false memories in an interrogation setting. 
Eyewitnesses, victims, and suspects are occasionally tested on their vulnerability to 
suggestive pressure (e.g., Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, Bragason, Newton, & Einarsson, 
2008), but there is virtually no empirical knowledge about whether the DRM 
paradigm could be a useful tool in an interrogation setting as well (Brainerd et al., 
2011).  
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Conclusion 
 To recap, we have shown that when using well-specified theoretical 
principles, developmental trends in false memories can be manipulated.  Although it 
is frequently the case that misinformation effects are more pronounced in younger 
than older children and adults, we found that developmental trends in these 
suggestion-based memory illusions can be reversed.  Indeed, across all of the 
misinformation experiments reported in this article, susceptibility to suggestion did 
not always decrease with age, and that under certain specific conditions, older 
children (and adults) were more prone to suggestion-induced false memories than 
younger children.    
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Footnotes 
1 The studies included in this review were identified using four search engines (Web 
of Science, PubMed, ScienceDirect, and Google Scholar). We looked for 
experimental papers that were written in English and published after 1978. We chose 
this time frame because Ceci and Bruck (1993) reported that only very few 
methodologically solid papers had been published before 1978. The terms we used for 
the literature search were: (children OR development) AND (suggestibility, 
misinformation, OR false memories). We also had several inclusion/exclusion 
criteria. We only included experiments that introduced misinformation (e.g., via 
suggestive questions, visual, auditory, embedded narratives) following some sort of 
witnessed event (classical misinformation paradigm). We did not include papers using 
the false memory implantation paradigm (e.g., Otgaar et al., 2010). Although these 
studies also introduce misinformation to participants, they follow a two-stage 
approach (misinformation and memory test) instead of the classic three-stage 
misinformation procedure (event, misinformation, and memory test) that we used in 
the current experiments. Also, we looked for papers that compared a minimum of two 
different age groups with at least one of them being a child group. 
2
 When we analysed the data using the raw scores or used another transformation 
(two-high threshold), our developmental reversal effects in all experiments were still 
robust. Also, when transforming scores using d’ and c, an additional correction should 
be applied for values that are zero or one as the formulae for getting d’ and c values 
do not accept zero or one values. As there is some controversy about which correction 
should be used, we used the rule that the values should be adjusted slightly up (.0001) 
for scores of zero or slightly below for scores of one (.9999) (see Snodgrass & 
Corwin, 1988; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). Of importance, using another correction 
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(e.g., .01) did not change our main developmental trends in suggestion-based false 
memories. As DRM studies lead to robust levels of true and false memory, our idea 
was that values of 1 or 0 represent a pure signal of hit rates or rejections. Because the 
raw zero and one values have first been corrected and then used to calculate d’ and c 
values, the raw means in the Tables cannot be used to accurately get the d’ and c 
values in the other Tables.  
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Table 1 
Developmental studies on the misinformation effect. 
Study Age (years) Event Form of 
misinformation 
Result 
Younger more 
suggestible 
than older 
Younger less 
suggestible 
than older 
No difference 
Cohen & Harnick 
(1980) 
9, 12, college 
students 
Video about 
petty crime 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
King & Yuille 
(1987) 
6, 9, 11, 16 Staged event Misleading 
questions 
x   
Ceci, Ross, & Toglia 
(1987), exp. 1 
3 - 12 Auditory story 
+ slides about a 
girl’s day at 
school (no 
crime) 
Misleading 
information 
x   
Ornstein, Gordon, Larus 
(1992) 
3, 6 Physical 
examination 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Oates & Shrimpton 
(1991) 
4 - 12 Blood 
collection, 
interaction with 
stranger 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Marin, Holmes, Guth, & Kovac 
(1979) 
5 - 22 Staged event 
(interaction 
between 
experimenters, 
no crime) 
Misleading 
questions 
  x (only one 
leading 
question) 
Duncan, Whitney, & Kunen  7, 9, 11, college Slides with Misleading  x  
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(1982), exp. 2 students short Star Wars 
episodes 
verbal 
information 
Flin, Boon, Knox, & Bull 
(1992) 
6, 10, adults Staged event 
(talk about foot 
hygiene, no 
crime) 
Misleading 
questions 
  x 
Rudy & Goodman 
(1991) 
4, 7 Interaction with 
stranger, 
watching 
interaction 
(playing board 
game) 
Misleading 
questions 
x actions that 
occurred 
 x overall 
Saywitz, Goodman, Nicholas, & 
Moan 
(1991) 
5, 7 Physical 
examination 
(genital and 
non-genital) 
Misleading 
questions 
x    
Perner & Wimmer 
(1988) 
2 - 4 Narrative about 
mother 
interacting with 
children (no 
crime) 
Embedded in 
narrative (only 
one item) 
x   
Ackil & Zaragoza 
(1995) 
7, 9, 11, college 
students 
Video about 
camp 
experiences (no 
crime) 
Embedded in 
narrative 
x   
Welch-Ross, Diecidue, & Miller 
(1997) 
3 - 5 Narrative about 
day of a girl 
Misleading 
questions 
x (4 min delay)  x (1 week 
delay) 
Hünefeldt, Rossi-Arnaud, & Furia 
(2009) 
4 - 7 Cartoon-video Misleading 
questions 
x    
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Hünefeldt, Lucidi, Furia, & Rossi-
Arnaud 
(2008) 
4 - 7 Cartoon-video Misleading 
questions 
x   
Kulkovsky & Klemfuss 
(2008) 
2 - 5 Staged event 
baking cookies 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Bright-Paul, Jarrold, & Wright 
(2008) 
3 - 7 Slide show 
about theft 
Embedded in 
narrative 
x   
Quas, Malloy, Melinder, 
Goodman, D’Mello, &Schaaf 
(2007) 
3, 5 Playing alone 
in laboratory 
Biased 
interviewer/ 
misleading 
questions 
x (misleading 
questions) 
x (only in free 
recall single 
interview , long 
delay) 
 
Roebers, Howie, & Beuscher 
(2007) 
6 - 8 Video about 
treasure hunt 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Melinder, Endestad, & 
Magnussen 
(2006) 
3, 6 Video showing 
children 
playing 
together 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Roebers & Schneider 
(2005) 
6, 7, 8, adults Video about 
treasure hunt 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Roebers, Gelhaar, & Schneider 
(2004) 
5 - 10 Staged event, 
video or slide 
show about 
visit of 
magician 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Alexander, Goodman, Schaaf, 
Edelstein, Quas, & Shaver 
(2002) 
3 - 7 Vaccination Misleading 
questions 
x   
Gobbo, Mega, & Pipe 
(2002), exp. 1 
3, 5 Participation, 
observation or 
Misleading 
questions 
x (immediate 
interview) 
 x (interview 1 
week later) 
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narration about 
playing with 
salt-dough 
Roebers & Schneider 
(2002) 
6, 8, 10 Video about 
money theft 
and treasure 
hunt 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Roebers, Bjorklund, Schneider, & 
Cassel 
(2002) 
5, 7, 10, adults Video about 
theft of a bike 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Newcombe & Dour 
(2001) 
5, 6 Story 
accompanied 
by pictures 
about pet 
Embedded in 
narrative 
x   
Templeton & Wilcox 
(2000) 
3, 4, 6, adults Video showing 
Sesame Street 
Embedded in 
narrative 
x (original test)  x (modified 
test) 
Otgaar, Candel, Smeets, & 
Merckelbach 
(2010) 
4-5, 8-11 Instructed 
interaction with 
a puppet 
Erroneous 
feedback 
x (commission 
error) 
 x (omission 
error) 
Development of False Memories 
 
 
76 
76 
Table 2 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of raw hits, and false alarms to critical lures, and non-presented related items as a 
function of age, type of detail, and valence (Experiment 1). 
Note. CL = Critical lures, Periph = Peripheral, Unrel = unrelated. 
 
 6/7-year-olds 11/12-year-olds Adults 
Misinformation Control Misinformation Control Misinformation Control 
Central  Periph Central  Periph Central  Periph Central  Periph Central  Periph Central  Periph 
Hits Neutral .63(.16) .46(.20) .60(.22) .41(.18) .77(.11) .73(.12) .77(.12) .74(.14) .72(.15) .73(.13) .71(.18) .70(.17) 
Negative .63(.27) .56(.22) .67(.26) .64(.14) .86(.11) .72(.17) .84(.15) .78(.14) .79(.13) .73(.13) .78(.14) .73(.17) 
CL Neutral .70(.33) .30(.30) .79(.34) .27(.25) .80(.21) .58(.24) .65(.15) .29(.33) .46(.38) .29(.11) .49(.24) .25(.15) 
Negative .12(.17) .58(.34) .42(.25) .83(.22) .46(.32) .74(.24) .37(.20) .69(.28) .48(.39) .56(.27) .33(.27) .46(.34) 
Related Neutral .00(.00) .17(.22) .00(.00) .06(.13) .00(.00) .09(.15) .00(.00) .09(.20) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) 
Negative .03(.10) .18(.23) .19(.26) .05(.13) .08(.14) .13(.22) .04(.11) .04(.11) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) 
Unrel -- .02(.03) .02(.02) .05(.06) .03(.04) .01(.03) .02(.02) 
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Table 3 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of d’ values of hits, and false alarms to critical lures, and non-presented related items 
as a function of age, type of detail, and valence (Experiment 1). 
Note. CL = Critical lures, Periph = Peripheral.
 6/7-year-olds 11/12-year-olds Adults 
Misinformation Control Misinformation Control Misinformation Control 
Central  Periph Central  Periph Central  Periph Central  Periph Central  Periph Central  Periph 
Hits Neutral 3.91(1.41) 3.24(1.56) 3.94(1.41) 3.39(1.49) 3.53(1.39) 2.97(2.09) 3.55(1.35) 3.02(2.15) 4.18(1.74) 4.13(1.35) 4.75(1.56) 4.57(1.54) 
Negative 3.79(1.68) 3.83(1.28) 3.81(1.78) 3.91(1.36) 3.88(1.48) 3.26(1.33) 3.93(1.63) 3.65(1.48) 4.91(1.45) 4.65(1.36) 4.31(1.50) 4.16(1.56) 
CL Neutral 7.00(4.80) 2.95(4.13) 8.57(3.88) 2.44(2.80) 6.62(4.41) 4.48(3.85) 4.19(2.69) .65(3.42) 3.81(6.05) 3.50(4.17) 5.60(3.51) 3.61(3.87) 
Negative .48(2.66) 5.43(5.39) 3.69(2.99) 9.44(4.50) 2.35(5.72) 6.39(2.96) 2.59(3.47) 5.62(5.07) 4.99(6.01) 6.30(3.60) 3.27(3.38) 4.77(5.35) 
Related Neutral -2.46(1.51) .65(2.31) -2.33(1.52) -.30(1.26) -3.29(1.52) -.89(1.87) -3.29(1.55) -1.12(1.65) -2.52(1.50) -1.27(1.50) -2.01(1.38) -.76(1.38) 
Negative -.25(1.55) .95(2.07) 1.01(1.68) -.50(2.21) -.78(1.89) -.75(2.03) -1.02(2.40) -1.45(1.81) -.28(1.38) -.76(1.38) -.79(1.50) -1.27(1.50) 
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Table 4 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of C scores of hits, and false alarms to and false alarms to critical lures, and non-
presented related items as a function of age, type of detail, and valence (Experiment 1). 
Note. CL = Critical lures, Periph = Peripheral.
 6/7-year-olds 11/12-year-olds Adults 
Misinformation Control Misinformation Control Misinformation Control 
Central  Periph Central  Periph Central  Periph Central  Periph Central  Periph Central  Periph 
Hits Neutral -1.40(.1.02) -2.07(.1.56) -1.46(1.30) -2.02(1.21) -.54(.1.06) -1.10(1.43) -.52(.1.15) -1.05(.146) -.96(.1.01) -1.09(1.00) -1.04(.1.19) -1.41(.78) 
Negative -1.76(1.94) -1.72(1.14) -1.50(1.88)_ -1.39(1.01) -.03(1.18) -.65(1.14) -.26(.95) -.54(.97) -1.08(.91) -1.33(.90) -.91(.94) -1.06(.94) 
CL Neutral 1.46(4.32) -2.59(6.22) .89(5.31) -5.24(4.41) 1.41(3.17) -.73(2.82) -1.02(2.32) -4.56(5.44) -3.33(4.75) -3.65(2.06) -2.95(2.72) -4.56(3.14) 
Negative -7.20(4.20) -2.25(4.82) -1.85(4.79) 2.80(3.68) -2.61(.3.58) 1.42(4.71) -2.81(2.66) .22(4.26) -3.56(5.15) -2.25(3.76) -3.87(4.63 -2.38(4.86) 
Related Neutral -4.65(2.67) -4.65(2.67) -5.60(2.85) -5.60(2.85) -4.96(2.41) -4.96(2.41) -5.19(2.44) -5.19(2.44) -6.49(.75) -6.49(.75) -6.75(.69) -6.75(.69) 
Negative -4.85(3.61) -4.34(3.15) -4.29(2.71) 5.80(1.87) -4.69(2.06) -4.66(2.63) -5.21(1.11) -5.64(1.78) -6.26(.69) -6.75(.69) -6.00(.75) -6.50(.75) 
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Table 5 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of raw DRM hits, and false alarms to 
critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age and valence 
(Experiment 1) 
 
 6/7-year-olds 11/12-year-olds Adults 
Neutral Negative Neutral Negative Neutral Negative 
Hits .35(.21) .52(.24) .58(.18) .66(.15) .75(.11) .75(.17) 
CL .30(.29) .51(.31) .61(.23) .79(.21) .69(.27) .67(.25) 
Related .15(.26) .23(.26) .19(.18) .35(.20) .06(.12) .18(.15) 
Unrel .18(.20) .23(.16) .09(.08) 
Note. CL = Critical lures, Unrel = Unrelated
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Table 6 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of d’ values for DRM hits, and false 
alarms to critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age and valence 
(Experiment 1) 
 
 6/7-year-olds 11/12-year-olds Adults 
Neutral Negative Neutral Negative Neutral Negative 
Hits 1.06(1.64) 1.55(1.66) 1.38(1.61) 1.62(1.62) 3.54(3.15) 3.44(2.59) 
CL -.04(2.67) 1.77(2.92) 1.66(1.86) 3.84(3.29) 4.80(3.56) 4.20(3.85) 
Related -2.69(4.11) -1.24(2.72) -1.78(3.32) .37(2.28) -2.97(3.13) .02(3.84) 
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Table 7 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of C values for DRM hits, and false 
alarms to critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age and valence 
(Experiment 1) 
 
 6/7-year-olds 11/12-year-olds Adults 
Neutral Negative Neutral Negative Neutral Negative 
Hits -1.40(2.45) -.89(2.53) -.37(1.09) -.13(1.03) -.47(1.47) -.57(.147) 
CL -1.97(4.74) -.16(4.54) -.08(1.78) 2.10(3.41) .79(3.70) .19(3.67) 
Related -4.62(5.06) -3.71(4.24) -3.52(3.43) -1.38(2.03) -6.98(3.29) -3.98(3.35) 
Note. CL = Critical lures. 
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Table 8 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of raw hits, and false alarms to critical 
lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age and valence (Experiment 2). 
 
 4/6-year-olds 7/9-year-olds 10/12-year-olds 
Central Peripheral  Central Peripheral  Central Peripheral  
Hits .56 (.23) .62 (.22) .74 (.17) .71 (.18) .81 (.12) .82 (.13) 
CL .30 (.32) .57 (.38) .62 (.29) .72 (.27) .57 (.31) .74 (.29) 
Related .11 (.23) .13 (.26) .17 (.17) .17 (.28) .13 (.19) .19 (.24) 
Unrel .03 (.05) .05 (.12) .01 (.02) 
Note. CL = Critical lures; Unrel = Unrelated  
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Table 9 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of d’ values for hits, and false alarms to 
critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age and valence 
(Experiment 2). 
 
 4/6-year-olds 7/9-year-olds 10/12-year-olds 
Central Peripheral  Central Peripheral  Central Peripheral  
Hits 5.35(2.55) 5.23(2.61) 6.02(2.84) 6.20(2.65) 7.80(2.85) 7.65(2.61) 
CL 1.89(4.06) 5.10(3.63) 5.62(3.00) 6.71(3.21) 6.19(3.99) 7.68(3.72) 
Related -.61(.3.11) .08(4.63) 1.29(3.03) .72(3.26) 1.52(4.00) 2.61(3.95) 
Note. CL = Critical lures.  
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Table 10 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of C values for hits, and false alarms to 
critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age and valence 
(Experiment 2). 
 
 4/6-year-olds 7/9-year-olds 10/12-year-olds 
Central Peripheral  Central Peripheral  Central Peripheral  
Hits -1.51(2.96) -1.68(2.18) -1.52(2.32) -1.34(2.97) -1.47(2.41) -1.62(2.21) 
CL -3.73(5.16) -.85(5.87) -1.27(3.55) .34(4.06) -2.24(3.08) -.24(4.37) 
Related -6.73(5.74) -6.05(6.04) -6.25(4.31) -6.82(5.12) -7.76(3.28) -6.67(4.18) 
Note. CL = Critical lures.  
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Table 11 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of raw DRM hits, and false alarms to 
critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age and valence 
(Experiment 2). 
 
 4/6-year-olds 7/9-year-olds 10/12-year-olds 
Neutral Negative Neutral Negative Neutral Negative 
Hits .50 (.26) .56 (.25) .53 (.24) .56 (.16) .56 (.20) .68 (.16) 
CL .41 (.32) .52 (.31) .40 (.29) .64 (.24) .63 (.30) .86 (.17) 
Related .23 (.28) .26 (.30) .16 (.18) .23 (.23) .15 (.18) .29 (.22) 
Unrel .28 (.26) .23 (.22) .21 (.14) 
Note. CL = Critical lures; Unrel = Unrelated  
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Table 12 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of d’ values for DRM hits, and false 
alarms to critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age and valence 
(Experiment 2). 
 
 4/6-year-olds 7/9-year-olds 10/12-year-olds 
Neutral Negative Neutral Negative Neutral Negative 
Hits 1.32(1.89) 1.54(1.90) 1.75(2.26) 1.86(2.35) 1.23(1.48) 1.58(1.31) 
CL .76(2.52) 1.39(3.09) .84(3.25) 2.91(2.92) 2.70(3.64) 5.17(3.52) 
Related -1.63(3.31) -1.50(3.44) -2.09(3.63) -.77(3.61) -2.81(3.34) -.80(3.22) 
Note. CL = Critical lures.  
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Table 13 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of C values for DRM hits, and false 
alarms to critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age and valence 
(Experiment 2). 
 
 4/6-year-olds 7/9-year-olds 10/12-year-olds 
Neutral Negative Neutral Negative Neutral Negative 
Hits -.68(1.70) -.50(.166) -.77(1.62) -.66(1.39) -.35(.72) -.00(.76) 
CL -1.23(4.72) 1.39(3.09) -1.68(3.75) 2.91(2.92) 1.11(3.60) 5.17(3.52) 
Related -3.56(4.89) -3.36(4.17) -4.60(3.84) -3.28(3.52) -4.40(3.48) -2.39(2.88) 
Note. CL = Critical lures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Development of False Memories 
 
 
88 
88 
Table 14 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of raw hits, and false alarms to critical 
lures, and non-presented (un)related items as a function of age (Experiment 3). 
 7/8-year-olds Adults 
Central Peripheral  Central Peripheral  
Hits .86 (.13) .63 (.21) .89 (.11) .76 (.11) 
CL .80 (.34) .70 (.29) .57 (.38) .75 (.27) 
Related .42 (.32) .16 (.23) .35 (.34) .16 (.24) 
Unrel .04 (.05) .01 (.03) 
Note. CL = Critical lures, Unrel = Unrelated  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Development of False Memories 
 
 
89 
89 
Table 15 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of d’ values for hits, and false alarms to 
critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age (Experiment 3). 
 7/8-year-olds Adults 
Central Peripheral  Central Peripheral  
Hits 6.77 (3.31) 4.46 (2.79) 9.52 (3.86) 6.87 (2.08) 
CL 8.19 (4.70) 6.79 (4.10) 7.12 (5.86) 8.80 (3.78) 
Related 2.83 (5.10) -.48 (3.33) 3.89 (4.73) 1.67 (3.86) 
Note. CL = Critical lures  
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Table 16 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of C values hits, and false alarms to 
critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age (Experiment 3). 
 7/8-year-olds Adults 
Central Peripheral  Central Peripheral  
Hits .92 (3.56) -1.36 (2.79) .36 (3.11) -2.29 (1.16) 
CL 2.08 (5.52) .98 (4.34) -2.05 (5.29) -.36 (4.02) 
Related -2.97 (4.78) -5.96 (4.82) -5.02 (5.03) -7.49 (3.58) 
Note. CL = Critical lures 
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Table 17 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of raw DRM hits, and false alarms to 
critical lures, and non-presented (un)related items as a function of age (Experiment 3). 
 7/8-year-olds Adults  
Hits .71 (.16) .81 (.13) 
CL .66 (.20) .81 (.19) 
Related .18 (.16) .21 (.20) 
Unrel .16 (.11) .07 (.05) 
Note. CL = Critical lures, Unrel = Unrelated  
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Table 18 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of d’ values for DRM hits, and false 
alarms to critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age (Experiment 
3). 
 7/8-year-olds Adults  
Hits 2.28 (1.99) 4.42 (2.94) 
CL 2.13 (2.42) 5.69 (4.04) 
Related -1.36 (3.02) .43 (3.90) 
Note. CL = Critical lures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Development of False Memories 
 
 
93 
93 
 
Table 19 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of C values for DRM hits, and false 
alarms to critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age (Experiment 
3). 
 7/8-year-olds Adults  
Hits -.33 (1.42) .19 (2.63) 
CL -.18 (2.13) 1.47 (3.41) 
Related -3.34 (3.84) -3.79 (3.32) 
Note. CL = Critical lures 
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Table 20 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of raw hits, and false alarms to critical 
lures, and non-presented (un)related items as a function of age (Experiment 4). 
 4/5-year-olds 7/8-year-olds 11/12-year-olds 
Central Peripheral  Central Peripheral  Central Peripheral 
Hits .67 (.24) .48 (.29) .87 (.12) .64 (.16) .88 (.11) .80 (.14) 
CL .66 (.40) .53 (.39) .88 (.22) .70 (.23) .73 (.36) .82 (.22) 
Related .47 (.28) .33 (.37) .43 (.17) .26 (.22) .37 (.22) .17 (.17) 
Unrel .23 (.29) .04 (.06) .04 (.05) 
Note. CL = Critical lures, Unrel = Unrelated  
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Table 21 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of d’ values for hits, and false alarms to 
critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age (Experiment 4). 
 4/5-year-olds 7/8-year-olds 11/12-year-olds 
Central Peripheral  Central Peripher
al  
Central Peripheral 
Hits 3.41(3.17) 2.02(2.76) 7.18(4.11) 4.77(2.86) 7.31(3.72) 6.17(3.41) 
CL 2.83(3.33) 1.82(2.41) 5.44(1.74) 3.81(1.81) 4.31(2.76) 4.76(1.90) 
Related 1.97(4.20) .14(3.92) 3.46(4.08) 1.70(2.92) 2.53(4.11) .65(3.96) 
Note. CL = Critical lures 
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Table 22 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of C values for hits, and false alarms to 
critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age (Experiment 4). 
 4/5-year-olds 7/8-year-olds 11/12-year-olds 
Central Peripheral  Central Peripheral  Central Peripheral 
Hits .05(3.87) -1.30(4.09) .60(3.11) -1.81(1.51) .51(3.45) -.31(3.01) 
CL .76(6.05) -1.17(6.40) 3.12(3.70) -.14(3.96) 1.01(5.57) 1.72(4.27) 
Related -1.51(5.04) -3.32(6.50) -3.12(2.52) -4.88(4.25) -3.95(3.44) -5.83(3.83) 
Note. CL = Critical lures 
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Table 23 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of raw DRM hits, and false alarms to 
critical lures, and non-presented (un)related items as a function of age (Experiment 4). 
 4/5-year-olds 7/8-year-olds 11/12-year-olds 
Hits .68 (.24) .74 (.13) .78 (.14) 
CL .64 (.28) .65 (.21) .75 (.24) 
Related .54 (.35) .23 (.19) .25 (.15) 
Unrel .48 (.33) .16 (.12) .13 (.09) 
Note. CL = Critical lures, Unrel = Unrelated  
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Table 24 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of d’ values DRM hits, and false alarms 
to critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age (Experiment 4). 
 4/5-year-olds 7/8-year-olds 11/12-year-olds 
Hits .63 (1.86) 2.26 (1.88) 3.20 (2.47) 
CL .81 (2.90) 2.73 (2.68) 4.55 (3.40) 
Related -.26 (3.12) -.80 (2.74) .85 (2.91) 
Note. CL = Critical lures 
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Table 25 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of C values DRM hits, and false alarms 
to critical lures, and non-presented related items as a function of age (Experiment 4). 
 4/5-year-olds 7/8-year-olds 11/12-year-olds 
Hits 1.48 (3.51) -.08 (1.01) -.34 (1.44) 
CL 1.70 (4.37) .39 (2.68) 1.06 (3.94) 
Related .67 (5.37) -3.14 (3.48) -2.64 (2.86) 
Note. CL = Critical lures 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Developmental studies on the misinformation effect (1a) and the DRM false 
memory illusion (1b). 
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Figure 1a 
  
Note. Studies that had different developmental results for different conditions were 
included several times in the graph. 
 
Figure 1b 
 
Note. These data have been reported in Brainerd et al. (2011).  
 
 
 
